With the ruling in the headnote la Corte Costituzionale dichiara l’illegittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ., nella parte in cui prevede che la notifica si perfeziona, per il destinatario, con la spedizione della raccomandata informativa, anziché con il ricevimento della stessa o, comunque, decorsi dieci giorni dalla relativa spedizione.
SENTENZA N. 3
ANNO 2010
REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
IN NOME DEL POPOLO ITALIANO
LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
composta dai signori:
- Francesco AMIRANTE Presidente
- Ugo DE SIERVO Giudice
- Paolo MADDALENA "
- Alfio FINOCCHIARO "
- Alfonso QUARANTA "
- Franco GALLO "
- Luigi MAZZELLA "
- Gaetano SILVESTRI "
- Sabino CASSESE "
- Maria Rita SAULLE "
- Giuseppe TESAURO "
- Paolo Maria NAPOLITANO "
- Giuseppe FRIGO "
- Alessandro CRISCUOLO "
- Paolo GROSSI "
ha pronunciato la seguente
SENTENZA
nei giudizi di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 del codice di procedura civile (Irreperibilità o rifiuto di ricevere la copia), promossi dal Tribunale di Bologna con ordinanza dell’11 febbraio 2008 e dalla Corte d’appello di Milano con ordinanza del 22 dicembre 2008, rispettivamente iscritte ai nn. 75 e 88 del registro ordinanze 2009 e pubblicate nella Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica, nn. 11 e 13, prima serie speciale, dell’anno 2009.
Visti gli atti di intervento del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri;
udito nella camera di consiglio del 4 novembre 2009 il Giudice relatore Paolo Maddalena.
Ritenuto in fatto
1. Con ordinanza emessa in data 11 febbraio 2008 (reg. ord. n. 75 del 2009), il Tribunale ordinario di Bologna ha sollevato, in riferimento agli artt. 111, primo e secondo comma, 3, primo comma, e 24, secondo comma, della Costituzione, questione di legittimità CONSTITUTIONAL. 140 cod. proc. Civ. (Unavailability or refusal to receive a copy), in so far as not expected to be heard to arise at the time of delivery to the addressee or a person recommended to him for information, or, if delivery has not yet occurred, the occurrence of complete storage of these recommendations.
The issue was raised during a trial in which he discusses the timeliness of the opposition to an injunction which service was effected pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. In point of
not manifestly unfounded, the referring court points out that the Constitutional Court has intervened several times (from the Judgement No 213, 1975, until the order n. 97 of 2004) about art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., always disregarding the objections of illegality in relation to the proposed closing of the fact that the notification occurs at the completion of the formalities prescribed by the rule, not the receipt of the letter.
The Court observes that the right of Bologna living on art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. shows two hours of arrest Joint Sections, both back to the last intervention of the Constitutional Court.
Order No. 458 of 2005, affirming the revocation of the notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. assuming that there is attached the return receipt della raccomandata all’originale dell’atto notificato, ha precisato che il dettato della norma realmente impone di ritenere che il perfezionamento si realizzi con la spedizione della raccomandata, anche perché, essendo questa diretta a disciplinare un effetto legale tipico (di conoscibilità), sul piano logico è ragionevole ritenere che il legislatore abbia inteso ancorare tale effetto ad una data certa qual è quella derivante dalla spedizione della raccomandata stessa.
Ad avviso del rimettente, con questa pronuncia la Corte di cassazione avrebbe affiancato all’effetto anticipato per il notificante un ulteriore provvisorio e anticipato effetto per il destinatario.
Secondo il Tribunale di Bologna, se appare logico che, Since the first notifying the person who enters into the proceedings (on), he compared the effect to be anticipated and therefore provisional, can not but arouse concern considering that the effect of the consignee would have to conclude that ontologically the procedural sequence. E - notes referring to - you do not see how it is possible that an act perfected subsequently become void for not having fulfilled its purpose on the basis of a quid pluris outside.
The court stated that a correction of this "problematic" profile is the order n. 627 of 2008, which stated that the Joint Sections, in the case of notification of the appeal either by mail is art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., the receipt is not a constitutive element of the notification, but only a further proof of intervening notificatorio procedure and thus the establishment of the hearing. His lack of production, then, "takes on an evidential rather than that of validity, for which there is no longer a need for consolidation effect improved to the recipient, which has already led to the dispatch of the letter.
This being the living law on Article formed. 140 cod. proc. Civ., to be understood in the sense that it represents the dispatch of recommended courses for the recipient, referring wonders how he can, by itself, put the ship was known to act in the sphere of the latter, if not based on a perfect and dramatic fiction. According to the court, there is ability to know when an act comes within the scope of the recipient, which occurs after the time it is sent in that direction. This is reflected, from a substantive standpoint, art. 1335 cod. Civ. which raises the presumption of knowledge of the acts accommodation choices when they arrive at the address, and not when they are sent to that address.
This logic is actually the root of the forecast, in Art. 140 cod proc. Civ., the recommended "with acknowledgment of receipt", and it is at the root, also the considerations on the role to be attributed to the warning in the above order of the sections together.
According to the court, there would be adequate protection for the recipient that is: "if the recipient is, by law he had no knowledge when information has come to its registered address, but when it was sent '.
to the recipient that is established there would be a reduction in defense of the terms (whether those proposed for an opposition, appear to be those of a constitution early) compared with patients receiving the notification a mani proprie oppure a mezzo posta.
Nel complessivo sistema notificatorio civile, nessuna altra ipotesi di notificazione confliggerebbe così evidentemente con il principio della ricezione.
Ad avviso del Tribunale rimettente, identificare, qualora il processo sia avviato con notifica ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ., l’instaurazione del contraddittorio con il momento perfezionativo della notifica dal punto di vista solo del notificante, senza tenere conto del momento in cui l’atto informativo entra (che è cosa diversa dall’esservi spedito) nella sfera di conoscibilità del notificato, significherebbe da un lato configurare il contraddittorio come mero simulacro e non in modo effettivo (il che contrasterebbe con l’art. 111, second paragraph of the Constitution in so far as it imposes the reality of the adversarial process at all) on the other's position to prevail over that of notifying notified without being supported by a reasonable need to protect the notifier (the that is inconsistent with the principle of equality of the parties always dictated by the same constitutional provision, both with the more general principle of "justice process", found in art. 111, first paragraph, Constitution).
The absence of reasonable grounds behind the legal fiction that identifies the opposing parties pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. contrary to the art. 3, first paragraph of the Constitution, in the sense of tax precept of reason as the boundary of the discretion of the legislator.
Finally, the "demotion" of the adversarial process, that Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. imposed by legal fiction, would harm the art. 24 of the Constitution, in so far as the second paragraph protects the right of defense as inviolable at every stage of the process, and thus at the time of the establishment of the contradictory terms of defense, which grants the legislature following the jus in vocatio are in fact reduced for those affected by the notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. in excess of that required to make improvement possible in a reasonable time of notification.
2. In proceedings before the Constitutional Court has intervened, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented Avvocatura General of the State, which found the ineligibility or otherwise, for the invalidity of the matter.
The issue is not acceptable, because the Court of Bologna did not indicate why it can not constitutionally be given a reading of Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ.
In any case, according to the state representative, the matter would be unfounded.
Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. art. 149 cod. proc. Civ. would not be useful to compare, because they serve different purposes. While the discipline dettata dall’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. – per l’ipotesi di notificazione eseguita personalmente dall’ufficiale giudiziario, ma resa impossibile per irreperibilità o rifiuto del destinatario – è ispirata all’evidente fine di non pregiudicare il diritto di difesa del notificante, a causa di circostanze personali o di possibili comportamenti dilatori del destinatario; l’art. 149 cod. proc. civ., invece, riguarda la diversa ipotesi di notificazione effettuata a mezzo del servizio postale e persegue l’inderogabile finalità di tutelare il diritto di difesa del notificatario.
La questione sollevata in riferimento all’art. 24 Cost. sarebbe, in via preliminare, inammissibile, perché il giudice rimettente non spiegherebbe quale sarebbe il termine “normale” per la difesa ed in quale misura esso sarebbe ridotto. In ogni caso, essa sarebbe infondata nel merito. Difatti, nell’ipotesi di notifica ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ. ciò che viene spedito con la raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento è l’avviso con il quale l’ufficiale giudiziario comunica alla parte di avere effettuato il deposito dell’atto nella casa comunale; nella notificazione a mezzo posta, invece, ciò che viene spedito è proprio l’atto da notificare. Pertanto, un problema di conoscenza effettiva dell’atto in questione, per l’ipotesi di notifica ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ., non si pone mai, in quanto, appunto, even with the receipt of the recommended recipient is not aware of the contents of the act. The state representative
excludes, then, that an issue of violation of due process and the effectiveness of the principle of adversary proceedings.
3. By order issued December 22, 2008 (reg. ord. No. 88 of 2009), the Court of Appeal of Milan raised, with reference to Arts. 3:24 Constitution, the question of the constitutionality of Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ., in so far, according to the living law, as does the effects of such notification to the recipient thereof, by the time the judicial officer, after making the deposit to be notified of the at the municipal offices and have posted the required notice to the door of the recipient, notificatorio complete the process by sending a letter with the addressee that receipt of the deposit containing news, rather than providing that service is performed has elapsed for ten days from the date of dispatch of the letter or the date the copy of the withdrawal, whichever is earlier, similar to Art. 8, fourth paragraph of the Law of 20 November 1982, No 890 (Service of documents by post and communications by mail relating to the service of judicial documents), as amended by art. 2 of Decree-Law of 14 March 2005, no 35 (Urgent provisions in the Plan of Action for the sustainable economic, social and territorial cohesion), ratified with amendments by Law 14 May 2005, No 80.
The Court of Appeal of the reasons for the existence of relevance to the dispute, noting that discusses just what is the date of notification of the order - made art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. - To be considered effective for recipients, the present appellants. Following the arguments of the Court of Cassation, endorsed by the chief justice's view that this date coincides with the day when the bailiff sends registered mail to the recipient (in this case March 22, 2004), the opposition should considerarsi tardiva e quindi improcedibile, perché proposta oltre il termine decadenziale di quaranta giorni di cui all’art. 641, primo comma, cod. proc. civ. (l’atto di opposizione essendo stato notificato a mezzo posta e consegnato agli ufficiali giudiziari in data 4 maggio 2004); mentre, reputandosi che la data coincida con il giorno di effettivo ritiro del piego (30 marzo 2004) o con il decorso dei dieci giorni successivi alla spedizione (1° aprile 2004), l’opposizione monitoria dovrebbe considerarsi tempestiva e quindi procedibile.
Quanto alla non manifesta infondatezza, il giudice a quo osserva che l’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. e l’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982 prevedono modalità notificatorie quite similar in the presence of similar factual conditions. In both cases, the notification can be made directly to the recipient, because the latter is not available on site or because the persons authorized to receive the bow in place of him refusing to receive it, or because you have the recipient's temporary absence or lack, absence or inability of the people mentioned above. In one case, that of Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ., the bailiff shall deposit the copy of the house to be notified of the municipality where the service must run, posting notices of deposit in a sealed envelope and sealed the door of the house or office or of the recipient, him and give notice by registered mail with return receipt, and likewise in the case of notification pursuant to Art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982, the agent deposits the postal bend at the post office responsible for the delivery or from a dependency, and attempt to serve the bow and its deposit at the post office or a dependency by giving notice to the recipient notice in a sealed envelope by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt. In essence, the only real structural difference would be that, in one case, the bailiff shall deposit the copy at the town hall, while another, the agent shall deposit the post office bow postale.
Si tratta allora di verificare – prosegue il rimettente – se questa differenza possa ex se giustificare l’operare della successiva regola differenziatrice secondo cui solo nella notifica postale il destinatario ha dieci giorni di tempo dalla spedizione della raccomandata per ritirare l’atto presso l’ufficio postale, senza che tale periodo decorra a suo svantaggio, laddove l’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. – secondo la tradizionale interpretazione di legittimità – fa coincidere la data della notifica con la stessa data di spedizione della raccomandata.
A seguito della sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 346 del 1998, il legislatore – con l’art. 2 del decreto-legge n. 35 del 2005 – not merely to introduce the obligation, express delivery of mail, but has also laid a rule of greater protection for the recipient's postal service by setting a time limit (maximum) ten days for removal of bend, deadline to apply to the effects of notification for the same recipient for the performance of any further proceedings and subsequent activities of interest. Therefore, with regard to service of judicial documents by post in cases of absence or refusal of Article. 8, second paragraph, of Law 890 of 1982, the system - now based on the general principle of separation of the subjective time of the procedure improved notificatorio - is complete in this sense: the notifier, following the ruling of the Constitutional Court No 477 of 2002, the notice is perfected, however, at the time of delivery to be notified of the act, for notificatario, perfected ten days after the date of dispatch of the letter of the second paragraph or from the date of the withdrawal of the bow, whichever is earlier .
Since, according to the exegesis of the Court of Cassation, the date of notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. coincides with the recipient for sending the letter, the very existence of such an interpretation, according to the court, set up and comply with the rule of law and not you take a different interpretations claiming to constitutionally.
So interpreted, the contested provision violates Article. 3 of the Constitution, because the same cases would be treated differently without justification. In fact, art. 8, fourth paragraph, of Law 890 of 1982, giving a time limit (maximum) ten days for removal of the bow, remove the root in the unjust erosion of the deadline for the next play defense activities (as is the case for appeal against a court order), showing the security situation of the parties in balance: on one hand, it leaves a reasonable time to the recipient to withdraw the measure, while, on the other, it makes it too expensive to notify the sender, which, however, may give notification to the act after a period of ten days.
A similar effect is not guaranteed by art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. exposing the recipient of a notification made under this rule to treatment less guaranteed, despite the assumptions made similar, and most importantly, based on a choice of the notification is made, usually by persons, the bailiff and the notifier, without any interest to obtain knowledge of the act by the notificatario.
There would also be a breach of Article. 24 of the Constitution, for the lesser protection afforded to the recipient of a notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., as these forced to patrol with his mailbox trend continued even in periods of vacation or holidays, to avoid the risk of losing time to the completion of defensive activities that take date from notification, and much less risky and costly is the situation the addressee of a postal notification pursuant to Art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982.
Moreover, the same Supreme Court, by Order of the Joint Sections No 458 of 2005, although it considered that the notification notifying the art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. take effect from the date of service of the bailiff, it nevertheless considered it necessary that the notifier, showing the receipt, ponga il giudice nelle condizioni di verificare se l’atto sia stato effettivamente consegnato al destinatario o sia comunque convenientemente entrato nella sua sfera di conoscibilità. Ciò, ad avviso del rimettente, significa che non ha più alcun rilievo la circostanza che, spedendo l’avviso ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ., l’ufficiale giudiziario metta il notificatario potenzialmente in grado di conoscere la natura dell’atto notificando, poiché ciò che conta, nella nuova ricostruzione interpretativa della Corte stessa, è la produzione dell’avviso di ricevimento come strumento per accertare l’effettiva conoscenza o conoscibilità dell’atto. Pertanto non vi sarebbe più motivo di distinguere the two forms of the present notification on the basis of a difference - the possibility of immediate knowledge of the highlights of the notification by the presence of prescribed art. 48 disp. att. cod. proc. Civ. - Which is not relevant, however, for the entry into force of the notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. or for notifying either the notificatario.
4. In proceedings before the Constitutional Court has intervened, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented Avvocatura General of the State, which found no grounds of the matter.
After finding that Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982 would not be usefully comparable, the Attorney noted that this is unfounded in the light of Article. 24 of the Constitution In this last respect, the state representative, first, that the problem raised by referring it to poses all notifications are made through the dispatch of a letter and that the ten-day period required under the said Article. 8 would not be adequate protection for the recipient.
5. In the vicinity of the closed session, the Attorney General of the State filed in either trial, written statement.
The state representative - in reiterating that the Constitutional Court, since 1975, said the constitutionality of the provision reported with regard to improvement of service from the date of dispatch of recommended and not that of receiving it - notes, with regard to the question raised by the Court of Bologna, the referral order is not unlawful prospect's new or different those already submitted and reviewed by the Constitutional Court. The different disciplines of the completion of the procedure notificatorio art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. than the postal service - it claims - has been amply justified by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, according to the state representative, the principle of the effectiveness of adversarial as a corollary of the broader principle of a fair trial enshrined in Article. 111 of the Constitution, adds nothing compared to what has already been established by the Constitutional Court with regard to rights guaranteed by the defense. The issue 24 of the Constitution would also be unfounded if viewed in the light of the individual case, the debtor having enjoyed a more than reasonable amount of time (forty days) to prepare his defense and to notify the summons as opposed to injunction .
In relation to the question raised by the Appeal Court of Milan, the Attorney General notes that the sentence no 346, 1998, the Constitutional Court said that the need tutti i procedimenti notificatori siano identici o strettamente omogenei – ciò che lederebbe la discrezionalità legislativa – bensì che viola il diritto di difesa la mancanza di un avviso del compimento delle formalità di cui all’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982 e la ristrettezza del termine di dieci giorni a seguito dei quali l’ufficio postale poteva rispedire al mittente l’atto senza che il destinatario avesse più la possibilità di reperirlo.
Secondo la difesa erariale, le modalità della notifica stabilite dall’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. garantiscono i diritti di difesa ed il ragionevole trattamento, non venendo in gioco alcuna necessità di uniformarle ulteriormente senza invadere il campo the discretion of its legislature.
legal considerations
1. The questions of constitutionality, raised by the Ordinary Court of Bologna (reg. ord. No. 75 of 2009) and the Court of Appeal of Milan (reg. ord. No. 88 of 2009), invest the art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. which, under the heading 'unavailability or refusal to receive the copy, "provides that if you can not make delivery to unavailability or inability or refusal of the persons mentioned in the previous article, the bailiff shall deposit a copy house in the town where the service must run, posting notices of deposit in a sealed envelope and sealed to the door of o dell’ufficio o dell’azienda del destinatario, e gliene dà notizia per raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento.
L’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. è denunciato da entrambi i rimettenti nella parte in cui, secondo il diritto vivente – quale risulta dalla consolidata giurisprudenza della Corte di cassazione, anche a Sezioni unite –, fa decorrere gli effetti della notifica, nei confronti del destinatario della stessa, dal compimento dell’ultimo degli adempimenti prescritti, ossia dalla spedizione della raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento.
Così interpretata, la norma denunciata – non prevedendo che il contraddittorio si instauri all’atto della consegna al destinatario o a chi per esso della registered information, or if delivery has not yet occurred, the occurrence of the complete inventory of these recommendations - would violate, in the opinion of the Court of Bologna, Articles. 3, first paragraph, 24, second paragraph and 111 first and second paragraphs of the Constitution, unreasonable, unjustified unequal treatment in relation to the service of judicial documents by mail, to the impact on the recipient's right to defense measures notified under Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. and the infringement of constitutional principles relating to due process (and contradictory equal parts).
The poll of constitutionality, with reference to Arts. 3:24 Constitution is urged by the Court of Appeal of Milan by indicating, as tertium comparationis, art. 8, fourth paragraph of the Law of 20 November 1982, No 890 (Service of documents by post and communications by mail relating to the service of judicial documents), as amended by art. 2 of Decree-Law of 14 March 2005, no 35 (Urgent provisions in the Plan of Action for the sustainable economic, social and territorial cohesion), ratified with amendments by Law 14 May 2005, No 80, which equates the completion of the notification by the side of the recipient with the course of ten days from the date of dispatch of the letter or the date of the withdrawal copia dell’atto, se anteriore.
2. Entrambe le ordinanze di rimessione attengono a questioni di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. e sono sollevate sotto profili analoghi; i relativi giudizi possono pertanto essere riuniti per essere decisi con un’unica pronuncia.
3. Preliminarmente, deve essere disattesa l’eccezione di inammissibilità sollevata dall’Avvocatura generale dello Stato con riguardo all’ordinanza di rimessione del Tribunale ordinario di Bologna sul rilievo che il giudice a quo sarebbe venuto meno all’onere di sperimentare la praticabilità di un’interpretazione adeguatrice.
Il giudice rimettente ha preso atto dell’essersi formata una interpretazione constant, from the same Supreme Court, in terms of living law, and required the intervention of this Court to address the compatibility checks consolidated with the constitutional principles.
4. The issue raised by the Ordinary Court of Bologna is inadmissible for another reason, preliminary, or failure to give reasons for the relevance of the question. The national court, in fact, has failed to fully describe the specific case before the examination is to clarify what effects would, in the trial court, sought declaration of unconstitutionality.
5. The question raised by the Appeal Court of Milan, however, is founded.
5.1. This Court has had occasion to scrutinize the constitutionality issues relating to art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., interpreted as meaning that service should be considered concluded with the delivery of recommended and not with his address. The sentence no
213 of 1975 said the issue is not founded on Articles. 3:24 of the Constitution.
Given that 'there are no constitutional impediments in the way of notifications that are regulated differently in relation to an individual basis and through them to the interests that must be protected ", this Court held that" under the civil trial, for warranty del diritto di difesa del destinatario delle notificazioni per ufficiale giudiziario deve ritenersi sufficiente che copia dell’atto pervenga nella sfera di disponibilità del destinatario medesimo», essendo «ovvio che, ove questi si allontani, sia un suo onere predisporre le cose in modo che possa essere informato di eventuali comunicazioni che siano a lui dirette».
La sentenza n. 213 del 1975 ha inoltre precisato che, nell’ambito del processo civile, «il diritto di difesa di ciascuna parte va contemperato con quello dell’altra, cosicché, con riguardo alle notifiche, a ragione vengono tenuti presenti non solo gli interessi del destinatario dell’atto, ma anche le esigenze del notificante, sul quale possono burdened notification within limitation. " Finally, he stressed that it is not useful for comparison with the art. 149 cod. proc. Civ., which, unlike art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. provides, in the case of service by mail, the receipt of the recommendation should be annexed to the original, with the result that the notification should be considered completed until the date of receipt of the letter. According to the ruling, in fact, the postal service does not provide for the recipient more guarantees than those provided by art. 140 cod. proc. Civ.: in the case of notification by mail, "return receipt regards the only operation prepared for the act pervenga nella sfera del destinatario ed equivale alla relata che l’ufficiale giudiziario appone in calce all’originale dell’atto qualora questo sia notificato ai sensi dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. Se il destinatario è irreperibile o il plico venga rifiutato, si ha affissione di avviso presso la casa del destinatario e se ne fa menzione nella ricevuta di ritorno (così come nel caso dell’art. 140 se ne fa menzione nella relata dell’ufficiale giudiziario), ma manca completamente il secondo avviso di cui all’art. 140 cod. proc. civ.».
Altre pronunce hanno confermato questa conclusione. Le ordinanze n. 76 e n. 148 del 1976, n. 57 del 1978 e n. 192 del 1980 hanno dichiarato la manifesta infondatezza di analoghe questioni di legittimità costituzionale della medesima disposizione, sollevate nella parte in cui questa consente di ritenere perfetta la notifica dalla data di spedizione della raccomandata da esso prescritta e non da quella della sua ricezione. La sentenza n. 250 del 1986 ricorda che la notificazione effettuata ai sensi dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. si perfeziona dopo il deposito della copia dell’atto nella casa comunale e l’affissione dell’avviso alla porta dell’abitazione o dell’ufficio o dell’azienda del destinatario e con la spedizione a quest’ultimo della raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento, senza che rilevino ai fini della perfezione della notificazione la consegna della raccomandata al destinatario e l’allegazione acknowledgment of receipt of the original. And Ordinance No. 904 of 1988 states that "once the fundamental requirement of placing a copy of the sphere to be notified of availability of the recipient - certainly needs met art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. with the posting of the notice of deposit - taking further corrective discipline in the way to guarantee that field is reserved to the discretion of the legislature in relation to different situations from time to time. "
5.2. Subsequent developments of constitutional law require to meditate upon these findings.
5.2.1. In primo luogo, la ratio che giustificava la spedizione della raccomandata come momento perfezionativo della notificazione ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ. in relazione alla necessità di bilanciare gli opposti interessi del notificante e del destinatario e all’esigenza di non addossare al primo i rischi inerenti al decorso del tempo per la consegna della raccomandata, non è più riproponibile nel sistema delle notifiche derivante dalla sentenza di questa Corte n. 477 del 2002. Per effetto di detta sentenza (con cui è stata dichiarata l’illegittimità costituzionale del combinato disposto dell’art. 149 cod. proc. civ. e dell’art. 4, terzo comma, della legge n. 890 del 1982, nella parte in cui prevedeva che la notificazione si perfezionasse, for notifying the date of receipt of the document by the recipient rather than that, earlier, delivery of the bailiff) is in fact now into this civil case, including the general rules on service of documents the principle that the time at which the notification should be considered completed for the notifier must be distinguished from that in which it is perfect for the recipient, with the result that, even for the notifications made pursuant to art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., for the purpose of compliance with a court against the notifier, it is sufficient that the act be delivered to the bailiff within the above term, while the formalities provided for by Article. 140 can also be carried out later (Case No. 28 of 2004, Ordinance No. 97 of 2004).
This means that, while notifying the art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., albeit subject to the successful outcome of the notification, avoids any forfeiture against him with the delivery of the bailiff, the recipient - in a context which, from the standpoint of the improvement of reporting continues to be anchored recommended the dispatch of information, ignoring its receipt (or other ways by the system deemed equivalent) - suffers from a reduction of terms for the performance of subsequent activities difensive, giacché questi cominciano a decorrere da un momento anteriore rispetto a quello dell’effettiva conoscibilità dell’atto.
Né la presunzione di conoscenza dell’atto da parte del destinatario con la semplice spedizione della raccomandata prevista dall’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. può ulteriormente giustificarsi con il ritenere che sia onere del destinatario, ove si allontani, di predisporre le cose in modo da poter essere informato di eventuali comunicazioni che siano a lui dirette. Difatti, l’evoluzione della vita moderna e gli spostamenti sempre più frequenti per la generalità delle persone fanno sì che l’onere di assunzione di misure precauzionali in vista di eventuali notificazioni non può operare anche in caso di assenze brevi del destinatario, poiché altrimenti il suo diritto di difesa sarebbe condizionato da oneri eccessivi.
5.2.2. In secondo luogo, è da tener presente che questa Corte, con la sentenza n. 346 del 1998, ha giudicato priva di ragionevolezza e lesiva della possibilità di conoscenza dell’atto da parte del destinatario la disciplina della consimile notificazione a mezzo posta di cui all’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982, dichiarandone l’illegittimità costituzionale: (a) sia nella parte in cui non prevedeva che, in caso di rifiuto di ricevere il piego o di firmare il registro di consegna da parte delle persone abilitate alla ricezione ovvero in caso di mancato recapito per temporanea recipient's absence or lack, absence or unsuitability of the above-mentioned persons, were given the same notice to the recipient by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt of the completion of the steps described and depositing bend, (b) is in as it provided that the bend was returned to the sender, if not purchased by the recipient, after ten days after the deposit at the post office.
At this point, after the declaration of unconstitutionality, the legislature has intervened, which, by art. 2 of Decree-Law No 35 of 2005, ratified with amendments by Law No 80, 2005, has replaced, for what is relevant, the second and fourth paragraphs of Article. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982, providing that: (a) the persons authorized to receive the bow in place of the recipient, they refuse to receive it, or if the agent can not deliver post to the recipient's temporary absence or lack, absence or unsuitability of persons mentioned above, the bend is deposited on the same day at the post office responsible for the delivery or from a dependency, (b) the attempt to serve the bow and its deposit at the post office or a dependent shall be given the recipient, by the agent in charge of postal delivery, by notice in a sealed envelope by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt, in case of absence the destination must be pinned to the front door or placed in the mail box of the home, office or business, (c) the notice must indicate the person who requested the notification and its Any defender, bailiff to whom the notice was required and the number of corresponding chronological record of the filing date and post office address or his reliance with which the deposit was made, and the express invitation to the recipient to provide for the receipt of the bow for him by the withdrawal of the same within a maximum period of six months, with the caveat you still have that service performed for ten days from the filing date and that it fails to do even the said period of six months, the document will be returned to the sender, (d) service you performed for ten days from the date of dispatch of the letter or the date of the withdrawal of the bow, whichever is earlier.
The result is a reversal of the previous system, in which he was the art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982 to provide for treatment for less guaranteed notificatario than develop, in the presence of similar conditions in fact, art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. because the postal service is perfected, for the recipient, not the mere sent by registered postal agent that gives notice dell'infruttuoso access, but ten days after forwarding the letter or in the shortest period is the actual removal of the envelope in storage. And this, moreover, in a context where the choice of the notification shall be made by persons, the bailiff and the notifier, without any interest to obtain knowledge of the act by the notificatario: Only the notifier, in fact may request the bailiff to personally make the notification and, when they do not, the bailiff may, at its discretion, choose the one o l’altro modo di notificazione (sentenza n. 346 del 1998).
5.3. Nell’attuale sistema normativo si è dunque verificata una discrasia, ai fini dell’individuazione della data di perfezionamento della notifica per il destinatario, tra la disciplina legislativa della notificazione a mezzo posta, dettata dal novellato art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982 – dove le esigenze di certezza nella individuazione della data di perfezionamento del procedimento notificatorio, di celerità nel completamento del relativo iter e di effettività delle garanzie di difesa e di contraddittorio sono assicurate dalla previsione che la notificazione si ha per eseguita decorsi dieci giorni dalla data di spedizione della lettera raccomandata informativa or from the date of withdrawal of the bow, whichever is earlier - the discipline and art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. in which the living law, for purposes of perfection of the notification to the recipient, emphasizes, for the sake of certainty, the single shipment of mail, is recovering well after receiving the recommended ex, be annexed to the notified , or with the interim or final consolidation of the effects occurred early in the meantime (Court of Cassation, Joint Sections, January 13, 2005, No. 458), or in terms of intervening further evidence of the proceedings notificatorio (Supreme Court, Sections united, January 14, 2008, n. 627). Clearly
that the contested provision, as interpreted by the living law, by the time limits for protection from the courts of the recipient to a date before the concrete of the knowability notified to him, violates the constitutional principles invoked by the court, for no reasonable balance between the interests of the notifier, which now no longer lies with the risks at the time of the procedure notificatorio, and those of the recipient in a matter in which, however, guarantees of defense and protection of an adversarial process must be based on actual charges and equal, and the unjustified unequal treatment with regard to this case, normatively comparable, the notificazione di atti giudiziari a mezzo posta, disciplinata dall’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982.
Deve pertanto essere dichiarata l’illegittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ., nella parte in cui prevede che la notifica si perfeziona, per il destinatario, con la spedizione della raccomandata informativa, anziché con il ricevimento della stessa o, comunque, decorsi dieci giorni dalla relativa spedizione.
per questi motivi
LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
riuniti i giudizi,
1) dichiara inammissibile la questione di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 del codice di procedura civile, sollevata, in riferimento agli artt. 111, primo e secondo comma, 3, primo comma, and 24, second paragraph of the Constitution, the Ordinary Court of Bologna with the order mentioned in the inscription;
2) declares that Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. in so far as it provides that the notification is perfected, the consignee, the shipment of the registered information, instead of receiving the same or at least ten days after its dispatch.
Decided in Rome, the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 11 January 2010.
F.to:
AMIRANTE Francis, President
Paolo MADDALENA, Editor
Giuseppe DI PAOLA, Registrar
lodged with the Registrar January 14, 2010.
SENTENZA N. 3
ANNO 2010
REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
IN NOME DEL POPOLO ITALIANO
LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
composta dai signori:
- Francesco AMIRANTE Presidente
- Ugo DE SIERVO Giudice
- Paolo MADDALENA "
- Alfio FINOCCHIARO "
- Alfonso QUARANTA "
- Franco GALLO "
- Luigi MAZZELLA "
- Gaetano SILVESTRI "
- Sabino CASSESE "
- Maria Rita SAULLE "
- Giuseppe TESAURO "
- Paolo Maria NAPOLITANO "
- Giuseppe FRIGO "
- Alessandro CRISCUOLO "
- Paolo GROSSI "
ha pronunciato la seguente
SENTENZA
nei giudizi di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 del codice di procedura civile (Irreperibilità o rifiuto di ricevere la copia), promossi dal Tribunale di Bologna con ordinanza dell’11 febbraio 2008 e dalla Corte d’appello di Milano con ordinanza del 22 dicembre 2008, rispettivamente iscritte ai nn. 75 e 88 del registro ordinanze 2009 e pubblicate nella Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica, nn. 11 e 13, prima serie speciale, dell’anno 2009.
Visti gli atti di intervento del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri;
udito nella camera di consiglio del 4 novembre 2009 il Giudice relatore Paolo Maddalena.
Ritenuto in fatto
1. Con ordinanza emessa in data 11 febbraio 2008 (reg. ord. n. 75 del 2009), il Tribunale ordinario di Bologna ha sollevato, in riferimento agli artt. 111, primo e secondo comma, 3, primo comma, e 24, secondo comma, della Costituzione, questione di legittimità CONSTITUTIONAL. 140 cod. proc. Civ. (Unavailability or refusal to receive a copy), in so far as not expected to be heard to arise at the time of delivery to the addressee or a person recommended to him for information, or, if delivery has not yet occurred, the occurrence of complete storage of these recommendations.
The issue was raised during a trial in which he discusses the timeliness of the opposition to an injunction which service was effected pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. In point of
not manifestly unfounded, the referring court points out that the Constitutional Court has intervened several times (from the Judgement No 213, 1975, until the order n. 97 of 2004) about art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., always disregarding the objections of illegality in relation to the proposed closing of the fact that the notification occurs at the completion of the formalities prescribed by the rule, not the receipt of the letter.
The Court observes that the right of Bologna living on art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. shows two hours of arrest Joint Sections, both back to the last intervention of the Constitutional Court.
Order No. 458 of 2005, affirming the revocation of the notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. assuming that there is attached the return receipt della raccomandata all’originale dell’atto notificato, ha precisato che il dettato della norma realmente impone di ritenere che il perfezionamento si realizzi con la spedizione della raccomandata, anche perché, essendo questa diretta a disciplinare un effetto legale tipico (di conoscibilità), sul piano logico è ragionevole ritenere che il legislatore abbia inteso ancorare tale effetto ad una data certa qual è quella derivante dalla spedizione della raccomandata stessa.
Ad avviso del rimettente, con questa pronuncia la Corte di cassazione avrebbe affiancato all’effetto anticipato per il notificante un ulteriore provvisorio e anticipato effetto per il destinatario.
Secondo il Tribunale di Bologna, se appare logico che, Since the first notifying the person who enters into the proceedings (on), he compared the effect to be anticipated and therefore provisional, can not but arouse concern considering that the effect of the consignee would have to conclude that ontologically the procedural sequence. E - notes referring to - you do not see how it is possible that an act perfected subsequently become void for not having fulfilled its purpose on the basis of a quid pluris outside.
The court stated that a correction of this "problematic" profile is the order n. 627 of 2008, which stated that the Joint Sections, in the case of notification of the appeal either by mail is art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., the receipt is not a constitutive element of the notification, but only a further proof of intervening notificatorio procedure and thus the establishment of the hearing. His lack of production, then, "takes on an evidential rather than that of validity, for which there is no longer a need for consolidation effect improved to the recipient, which has already led to the dispatch of the letter.
This being the living law on Article formed. 140 cod. proc. Civ., to be understood in the sense that it represents the dispatch of recommended courses for the recipient, referring wonders how he can, by itself, put the ship was known to act in the sphere of the latter, if not based on a perfect and dramatic fiction. According to the court, there is ability to know when an act comes within the scope of the recipient, which occurs after the time it is sent in that direction. This is reflected, from a substantive standpoint, art. 1335 cod. Civ. which raises the presumption of knowledge of the acts accommodation choices when they arrive at the address, and not when they are sent to that address.
This logic is actually the root of the forecast, in Art. 140 cod proc. Civ., the recommended "with acknowledgment of receipt", and it is at the root, also the considerations on the role to be attributed to the warning in the above order of the sections together.
According to the court, there would be adequate protection for the recipient that is: "if the recipient is, by law he had no knowledge when information has come to its registered address, but when it was sent '.
to the recipient that is established there would be a reduction in defense of the terms (whether those proposed for an opposition, appear to be those of a constitution early) compared with patients receiving the notification a mani proprie oppure a mezzo posta.
Nel complessivo sistema notificatorio civile, nessuna altra ipotesi di notificazione confliggerebbe così evidentemente con il principio della ricezione.
Ad avviso del Tribunale rimettente, identificare, qualora il processo sia avviato con notifica ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ., l’instaurazione del contraddittorio con il momento perfezionativo della notifica dal punto di vista solo del notificante, senza tenere conto del momento in cui l’atto informativo entra (che è cosa diversa dall’esservi spedito) nella sfera di conoscibilità del notificato, significherebbe da un lato configurare il contraddittorio come mero simulacro e non in modo effettivo (il che contrasterebbe con l’art. 111, second paragraph of the Constitution in so far as it imposes the reality of the adversarial process at all) on the other's position to prevail over that of notifying notified without being supported by a reasonable need to protect the notifier (the that is inconsistent with the principle of equality of the parties always dictated by the same constitutional provision, both with the more general principle of "justice process", found in art. 111, first paragraph, Constitution).
The absence of reasonable grounds behind the legal fiction that identifies the opposing parties pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. contrary to the art. 3, first paragraph of the Constitution, in the sense of tax precept of reason as the boundary of the discretion of the legislator.
Finally, the "demotion" of the adversarial process, that Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. imposed by legal fiction, would harm the art. 24 of the Constitution, in so far as the second paragraph protects the right of defense as inviolable at every stage of the process, and thus at the time of the establishment of the contradictory terms of defense, which grants the legislature following the jus in vocatio are in fact reduced for those affected by the notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. in excess of that required to make improvement possible in a reasonable time of notification.
2. In proceedings before the Constitutional Court has intervened, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented Avvocatura General of the State, which found the ineligibility or otherwise, for the invalidity of the matter.
The issue is not acceptable, because the Court of Bologna did not indicate why it can not constitutionally be given a reading of Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ.
In any case, according to the state representative, the matter would be unfounded.
Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. art. 149 cod. proc. Civ. would not be useful to compare, because they serve different purposes. While the discipline dettata dall’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. – per l’ipotesi di notificazione eseguita personalmente dall’ufficiale giudiziario, ma resa impossibile per irreperibilità o rifiuto del destinatario – è ispirata all’evidente fine di non pregiudicare il diritto di difesa del notificante, a causa di circostanze personali o di possibili comportamenti dilatori del destinatario; l’art. 149 cod. proc. civ., invece, riguarda la diversa ipotesi di notificazione effettuata a mezzo del servizio postale e persegue l’inderogabile finalità di tutelare il diritto di difesa del notificatario.
La questione sollevata in riferimento all’art. 24 Cost. sarebbe, in via preliminare, inammissibile, perché il giudice rimettente non spiegherebbe quale sarebbe il termine “normale” per la difesa ed in quale misura esso sarebbe ridotto. In ogni caso, essa sarebbe infondata nel merito. Difatti, nell’ipotesi di notifica ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ. ciò che viene spedito con la raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento è l’avviso con il quale l’ufficiale giudiziario comunica alla parte di avere effettuato il deposito dell’atto nella casa comunale; nella notificazione a mezzo posta, invece, ciò che viene spedito è proprio l’atto da notificare. Pertanto, un problema di conoscenza effettiva dell’atto in questione, per l’ipotesi di notifica ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ., non si pone mai, in quanto, appunto, even with the receipt of the recommended recipient is not aware of the contents of the act. The state representative
excludes, then, that an issue of violation of due process and the effectiveness of the principle of adversary proceedings.
3. By order issued December 22, 2008 (reg. ord. No. 88 of 2009), the Court of Appeal of Milan raised, with reference to Arts. 3:24 Constitution, the question of the constitutionality of Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ., in so far, according to the living law, as does the effects of such notification to the recipient thereof, by the time the judicial officer, after making the deposit to be notified of the at the municipal offices and have posted the required notice to the door of the recipient, notificatorio complete the process by sending a letter with the addressee that receipt of the deposit containing news, rather than providing that service is performed has elapsed for ten days from the date of dispatch of the letter or the date the copy of the withdrawal, whichever is earlier, similar to Art. 8, fourth paragraph of the Law of 20 November 1982, No 890 (Service of documents by post and communications by mail relating to the service of judicial documents), as amended by art. 2 of Decree-Law of 14 March 2005, no 35 (Urgent provisions in the Plan of Action for the sustainable economic, social and territorial cohesion), ratified with amendments by Law 14 May 2005, No 80.
The Court of Appeal of the reasons for the existence of relevance to the dispute, noting that discusses just what is the date of notification of the order - made art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. - To be considered effective for recipients, the present appellants. Following the arguments of the Court of Cassation, endorsed by the chief justice's view that this date coincides with the day when the bailiff sends registered mail to the recipient (in this case March 22, 2004), the opposition should considerarsi tardiva e quindi improcedibile, perché proposta oltre il termine decadenziale di quaranta giorni di cui all’art. 641, primo comma, cod. proc. civ. (l’atto di opposizione essendo stato notificato a mezzo posta e consegnato agli ufficiali giudiziari in data 4 maggio 2004); mentre, reputandosi che la data coincida con il giorno di effettivo ritiro del piego (30 marzo 2004) o con il decorso dei dieci giorni successivi alla spedizione (1° aprile 2004), l’opposizione monitoria dovrebbe considerarsi tempestiva e quindi procedibile.
Quanto alla non manifesta infondatezza, il giudice a quo osserva che l’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. e l’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982 prevedono modalità notificatorie quite similar in the presence of similar factual conditions. In both cases, the notification can be made directly to the recipient, because the latter is not available on site or because the persons authorized to receive the bow in place of him refusing to receive it, or because you have the recipient's temporary absence or lack, absence or inability of the people mentioned above. In one case, that of Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ., the bailiff shall deposit the copy of the house to be notified of the municipality where the service must run, posting notices of deposit in a sealed envelope and sealed the door of the house or office or of the recipient, him and give notice by registered mail with return receipt, and likewise in the case of notification pursuant to Art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982, the agent deposits the postal bend at the post office responsible for the delivery or from a dependency, and attempt to serve the bow and its deposit at the post office or a dependency by giving notice to the recipient notice in a sealed envelope by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt. In essence, the only real structural difference would be that, in one case, the bailiff shall deposit the copy at the town hall, while another, the agent shall deposit the post office bow postale.
Si tratta allora di verificare – prosegue il rimettente – se questa differenza possa ex se giustificare l’operare della successiva regola differenziatrice secondo cui solo nella notifica postale il destinatario ha dieci giorni di tempo dalla spedizione della raccomandata per ritirare l’atto presso l’ufficio postale, senza che tale periodo decorra a suo svantaggio, laddove l’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. – secondo la tradizionale interpretazione di legittimità – fa coincidere la data della notifica con la stessa data di spedizione della raccomandata.
A seguito della sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 346 del 1998, il legislatore – con l’art. 2 del decreto-legge n. 35 del 2005 – not merely to introduce the obligation, express delivery of mail, but has also laid a rule of greater protection for the recipient's postal service by setting a time limit (maximum) ten days for removal of bend, deadline to apply to the effects of notification for the same recipient for the performance of any further proceedings and subsequent activities of interest. Therefore, with regard to service of judicial documents by post in cases of absence or refusal of Article. 8, second paragraph, of Law 890 of 1982, the system - now based on the general principle of separation of the subjective time of the procedure improved notificatorio - is complete in this sense: the notifier, following the ruling of the Constitutional Court No 477 of 2002, the notice is perfected, however, at the time of delivery to be notified of the act, for notificatario, perfected ten days after the date of dispatch of the letter of the second paragraph or from the date of the withdrawal of the bow, whichever is earlier .
Since, according to the exegesis of the Court of Cassation, the date of notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. coincides with the recipient for sending the letter, the very existence of such an interpretation, according to the court, set up and comply with the rule of law and not you take a different interpretations claiming to constitutionally.
So interpreted, the contested provision violates Article. 3 of the Constitution, because the same cases would be treated differently without justification. In fact, art. 8, fourth paragraph, of Law 890 of 1982, giving a time limit (maximum) ten days for removal of the bow, remove the root in the unjust erosion of the deadline for the next play defense activities (as is the case for appeal against a court order), showing the security situation of the parties in balance: on one hand, it leaves a reasonable time to the recipient to withdraw the measure, while, on the other, it makes it too expensive to notify the sender, which, however, may give notification to the act after a period of ten days.
A similar effect is not guaranteed by art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. exposing the recipient of a notification made under this rule to treatment less guaranteed, despite the assumptions made similar, and most importantly, based on a choice of the notification is made, usually by persons, the bailiff and the notifier, without any interest to obtain knowledge of the act by the notificatario.
There would also be a breach of Article. 24 of the Constitution, for the lesser protection afforded to the recipient of a notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., as these forced to patrol with his mailbox trend continued even in periods of vacation or holidays, to avoid the risk of losing time to the completion of defensive activities that take date from notification, and much less risky and costly is the situation the addressee of a postal notification pursuant to Art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982.
Moreover, the same Supreme Court, by Order of the Joint Sections No 458 of 2005, although it considered that the notification notifying the art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. take effect from the date of service of the bailiff, it nevertheless considered it necessary that the notifier, showing the receipt, ponga il giudice nelle condizioni di verificare se l’atto sia stato effettivamente consegnato al destinatario o sia comunque convenientemente entrato nella sua sfera di conoscibilità. Ciò, ad avviso del rimettente, significa che non ha più alcun rilievo la circostanza che, spedendo l’avviso ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ., l’ufficiale giudiziario metta il notificatario potenzialmente in grado di conoscere la natura dell’atto notificando, poiché ciò che conta, nella nuova ricostruzione interpretativa della Corte stessa, è la produzione dell’avviso di ricevimento come strumento per accertare l’effettiva conoscenza o conoscibilità dell’atto. Pertanto non vi sarebbe più motivo di distinguere the two forms of the present notification on the basis of a difference - the possibility of immediate knowledge of the highlights of the notification by the presence of prescribed art. 48 disp. att. cod. proc. Civ. - Which is not relevant, however, for the entry into force of the notification pursuant to Art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. or for notifying either the notificatario.
4. In proceedings before the Constitutional Court has intervened, the President of the Council of Ministers, represented Avvocatura General of the State, which found no grounds of the matter.
After finding that Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982 would not be usefully comparable, the Attorney noted that this is unfounded in the light of Article. 24 of the Constitution In this last respect, the state representative, first, that the problem raised by referring it to poses all notifications are made through the dispatch of a letter and that the ten-day period required under the said Article. 8 would not be adequate protection for the recipient.
5. In the vicinity of the closed session, the Attorney General of the State filed in either trial, written statement.
The state representative - in reiterating that the Constitutional Court, since 1975, said the constitutionality of the provision reported with regard to improvement of service from the date of dispatch of recommended and not that of receiving it - notes, with regard to the question raised by the Court of Bologna, the referral order is not unlawful prospect's new or different those already submitted and reviewed by the Constitutional Court. The different disciplines of the completion of the procedure notificatorio art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. than the postal service - it claims - has been amply justified by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, according to the state representative, the principle of the effectiveness of adversarial as a corollary of the broader principle of a fair trial enshrined in Article. 111 of the Constitution, adds nothing compared to what has already been established by the Constitutional Court with regard to rights guaranteed by the defense. The issue 24 of the Constitution would also be unfounded if viewed in the light of the individual case, the debtor having enjoyed a more than reasonable amount of time (forty days) to prepare his defense and to notify the summons as opposed to injunction .
In relation to the question raised by the Appeal Court of Milan, the Attorney General notes that the sentence no 346, 1998, the Constitutional Court said that the need tutti i procedimenti notificatori siano identici o strettamente omogenei – ciò che lederebbe la discrezionalità legislativa – bensì che viola il diritto di difesa la mancanza di un avviso del compimento delle formalità di cui all’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982 e la ristrettezza del termine di dieci giorni a seguito dei quali l’ufficio postale poteva rispedire al mittente l’atto senza che il destinatario avesse più la possibilità di reperirlo.
Secondo la difesa erariale, le modalità della notifica stabilite dall’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. garantiscono i diritti di difesa ed il ragionevole trattamento, non venendo in gioco alcuna necessità di uniformarle ulteriormente senza invadere il campo the discretion of its legislature.
legal considerations
1. The questions of constitutionality, raised by the Ordinary Court of Bologna (reg. ord. No. 75 of 2009) and the Court of Appeal of Milan (reg. ord. No. 88 of 2009), invest the art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. which, under the heading 'unavailability or refusal to receive the copy, "provides that if you can not make delivery to unavailability or inability or refusal of the persons mentioned in the previous article, the bailiff shall deposit a copy house in the town where the service must run, posting notices of deposit in a sealed envelope and sealed to the door of o dell’ufficio o dell’azienda del destinatario, e gliene dà notizia per raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento.
L’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. è denunciato da entrambi i rimettenti nella parte in cui, secondo il diritto vivente – quale risulta dalla consolidata giurisprudenza della Corte di cassazione, anche a Sezioni unite –, fa decorrere gli effetti della notifica, nei confronti del destinatario della stessa, dal compimento dell’ultimo degli adempimenti prescritti, ossia dalla spedizione della raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento.
Così interpretata, la norma denunciata – non prevedendo che il contraddittorio si instauri all’atto della consegna al destinatario o a chi per esso della registered information, or if delivery has not yet occurred, the occurrence of the complete inventory of these recommendations - would violate, in the opinion of the Court of Bologna, Articles. 3, first paragraph, 24, second paragraph and 111 first and second paragraphs of the Constitution, unreasonable, unjustified unequal treatment in relation to the service of judicial documents by mail, to the impact on the recipient's right to defense measures notified under Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. and the infringement of constitutional principles relating to due process (and contradictory equal parts).
The poll of constitutionality, with reference to Arts. 3:24 Constitution is urged by the Court of Appeal of Milan by indicating, as tertium comparationis, art. 8, fourth paragraph of the Law of 20 November 1982, No 890 (Service of documents by post and communications by mail relating to the service of judicial documents), as amended by art. 2 of Decree-Law of 14 March 2005, no 35 (Urgent provisions in the Plan of Action for the sustainable economic, social and territorial cohesion), ratified with amendments by Law 14 May 2005, No 80, which equates the completion of the notification by the side of the recipient with the course of ten days from the date of dispatch of the letter or the date of the withdrawal copia dell’atto, se anteriore.
2. Entrambe le ordinanze di rimessione attengono a questioni di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. e sono sollevate sotto profili analoghi; i relativi giudizi possono pertanto essere riuniti per essere decisi con un’unica pronuncia.
3. Preliminarmente, deve essere disattesa l’eccezione di inammissibilità sollevata dall’Avvocatura generale dello Stato con riguardo all’ordinanza di rimessione del Tribunale ordinario di Bologna sul rilievo che il giudice a quo sarebbe venuto meno all’onere di sperimentare la praticabilità di un’interpretazione adeguatrice.
Il giudice rimettente ha preso atto dell’essersi formata una interpretazione constant, from the same Supreme Court, in terms of living law, and required the intervention of this Court to address the compatibility checks consolidated with the constitutional principles.
4. The issue raised by the Ordinary Court of Bologna is inadmissible for another reason, preliminary, or failure to give reasons for the relevance of the question. The national court, in fact, has failed to fully describe the specific case before the examination is to clarify what effects would, in the trial court, sought declaration of unconstitutionality.
5. The question raised by the Appeal Court of Milan, however, is founded.
5.1. This Court has had occasion to scrutinize the constitutionality issues relating to art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., interpreted as meaning that service should be considered concluded with the delivery of recommended and not with his address. The sentence no
213 of 1975 said the issue is not founded on Articles. 3:24 of the Constitution.
Given that 'there are no constitutional impediments in the way of notifications that are regulated differently in relation to an individual basis and through them to the interests that must be protected ", this Court held that" under the civil trial, for warranty del diritto di difesa del destinatario delle notificazioni per ufficiale giudiziario deve ritenersi sufficiente che copia dell’atto pervenga nella sfera di disponibilità del destinatario medesimo», essendo «ovvio che, ove questi si allontani, sia un suo onere predisporre le cose in modo che possa essere informato di eventuali comunicazioni che siano a lui dirette».
La sentenza n. 213 del 1975 ha inoltre precisato che, nell’ambito del processo civile, «il diritto di difesa di ciascuna parte va contemperato con quello dell’altra, cosicché, con riguardo alle notifiche, a ragione vengono tenuti presenti non solo gli interessi del destinatario dell’atto, ma anche le esigenze del notificante, sul quale possono burdened notification within limitation. " Finally, he stressed that it is not useful for comparison with the art. 149 cod. proc. Civ., which, unlike art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. provides, in the case of service by mail, the receipt of the recommendation should be annexed to the original, with the result that the notification should be considered completed until the date of receipt of the letter. According to the ruling, in fact, the postal service does not provide for the recipient more guarantees than those provided by art. 140 cod. proc. Civ.: in the case of notification by mail, "return receipt regards the only operation prepared for the act pervenga nella sfera del destinatario ed equivale alla relata che l’ufficiale giudiziario appone in calce all’originale dell’atto qualora questo sia notificato ai sensi dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. Se il destinatario è irreperibile o il plico venga rifiutato, si ha affissione di avviso presso la casa del destinatario e se ne fa menzione nella ricevuta di ritorno (così come nel caso dell’art. 140 se ne fa menzione nella relata dell’ufficiale giudiziario), ma manca completamente il secondo avviso di cui all’art. 140 cod. proc. civ.».
Altre pronunce hanno confermato questa conclusione. Le ordinanze n. 76 e n. 148 del 1976, n. 57 del 1978 e n. 192 del 1980 hanno dichiarato la manifesta infondatezza di analoghe questioni di legittimità costituzionale della medesima disposizione, sollevate nella parte in cui questa consente di ritenere perfetta la notifica dalla data di spedizione della raccomandata da esso prescritta e non da quella della sua ricezione. La sentenza n. 250 del 1986 ricorda che la notificazione effettuata ai sensi dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. si perfeziona dopo il deposito della copia dell’atto nella casa comunale e l’affissione dell’avviso alla porta dell’abitazione o dell’ufficio o dell’azienda del destinatario e con la spedizione a quest’ultimo della raccomandata con avviso di ricevimento, senza che rilevino ai fini della perfezione della notificazione la consegna della raccomandata al destinatario e l’allegazione acknowledgment of receipt of the original. And Ordinance No. 904 of 1988 states that "once the fundamental requirement of placing a copy of the sphere to be notified of availability of the recipient - certainly needs met art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. with the posting of the notice of deposit - taking further corrective discipline in the way to guarantee that field is reserved to the discretion of the legislature in relation to different situations from time to time. "
5.2. Subsequent developments of constitutional law require to meditate upon these findings.
5.2.1. In primo luogo, la ratio che giustificava la spedizione della raccomandata come momento perfezionativo della notificazione ex art. 140 cod. proc. civ. in relazione alla necessità di bilanciare gli opposti interessi del notificante e del destinatario e all’esigenza di non addossare al primo i rischi inerenti al decorso del tempo per la consegna della raccomandata, non è più riproponibile nel sistema delle notifiche derivante dalla sentenza di questa Corte n. 477 del 2002. Per effetto di detta sentenza (con cui è stata dichiarata l’illegittimità costituzionale del combinato disposto dell’art. 149 cod. proc. civ. e dell’art. 4, terzo comma, della legge n. 890 del 1982, nella parte in cui prevedeva che la notificazione si perfezionasse, for notifying the date of receipt of the document by the recipient rather than that, earlier, delivery of the bailiff) is in fact now into this civil case, including the general rules on service of documents the principle that the time at which the notification should be considered completed for the notifier must be distinguished from that in which it is perfect for the recipient, with the result that, even for the notifications made pursuant to art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., for the purpose of compliance with a court against the notifier, it is sufficient that the act be delivered to the bailiff within the above term, while the formalities provided for by Article. 140 can also be carried out later (Case No. 28 of 2004, Ordinance No. 97 of 2004).
This means that, while notifying the art. 140 cod. proc. Civ., albeit subject to the successful outcome of the notification, avoids any forfeiture against him with the delivery of the bailiff, the recipient - in a context which, from the standpoint of the improvement of reporting continues to be anchored recommended the dispatch of information, ignoring its receipt (or other ways by the system deemed equivalent) - suffers from a reduction of terms for the performance of subsequent activities difensive, giacché questi cominciano a decorrere da un momento anteriore rispetto a quello dell’effettiva conoscibilità dell’atto.
Né la presunzione di conoscenza dell’atto da parte del destinatario con la semplice spedizione della raccomandata prevista dall’art. 140 cod. proc. civ. può ulteriormente giustificarsi con il ritenere che sia onere del destinatario, ove si allontani, di predisporre le cose in modo da poter essere informato di eventuali comunicazioni che siano a lui dirette. Difatti, l’evoluzione della vita moderna e gli spostamenti sempre più frequenti per la generalità delle persone fanno sì che l’onere di assunzione di misure precauzionali in vista di eventuali notificazioni non può operare anche in caso di assenze brevi del destinatario, poiché altrimenti il suo diritto di difesa sarebbe condizionato da oneri eccessivi.
5.2.2. In secondo luogo, è da tener presente che questa Corte, con la sentenza n. 346 del 1998, ha giudicato priva di ragionevolezza e lesiva della possibilità di conoscenza dell’atto da parte del destinatario la disciplina della consimile notificazione a mezzo posta di cui all’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982, dichiarandone l’illegittimità costituzionale: (a) sia nella parte in cui non prevedeva che, in caso di rifiuto di ricevere il piego o di firmare il registro di consegna da parte delle persone abilitate alla ricezione ovvero in caso di mancato recapito per temporanea recipient's absence or lack, absence or unsuitability of the above-mentioned persons, were given the same notice to the recipient by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt of the completion of the steps described and depositing bend, (b) is in as it provided that the bend was returned to the sender, if not purchased by the recipient, after ten days after the deposit at the post office.
At this point, after the declaration of unconstitutionality, the legislature has intervened, which, by art. 2 of Decree-Law No 35 of 2005, ratified with amendments by Law No 80, 2005, has replaced, for what is relevant, the second and fourth paragraphs of Article. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982, providing that: (a) the persons authorized to receive the bow in place of the recipient, they refuse to receive it, or if the agent can not deliver post to the recipient's temporary absence or lack, absence or unsuitability of persons mentioned above, the bend is deposited on the same day at the post office responsible for the delivery or from a dependency, (b) the attempt to serve the bow and its deposit at the post office or a dependent shall be given the recipient, by the agent in charge of postal delivery, by notice in a sealed envelope by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt, in case of absence the destination must be pinned to the front door or placed in the mail box of the home, office or business, (c) the notice must indicate the person who requested the notification and its Any defender, bailiff to whom the notice was required and the number of corresponding chronological record of the filing date and post office address or his reliance with which the deposit was made, and the express invitation to the recipient to provide for the receipt of the bow for him by the withdrawal of the same within a maximum period of six months, with the caveat you still have that service performed for ten days from the filing date and that it fails to do even the said period of six months, the document will be returned to the sender, (d) service you performed for ten days from the date of dispatch of the letter or the date of the withdrawal of the bow, whichever is earlier.
The result is a reversal of the previous system, in which he was the art. 8 of Law No 890 of 1982 to provide for treatment for less guaranteed notificatario than develop, in the presence of similar conditions in fact, art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. because the postal service is perfected, for the recipient, not the mere sent by registered postal agent that gives notice dell'infruttuoso access, but ten days after forwarding the letter or in the shortest period is the actual removal of the envelope in storage. And this, moreover, in a context where the choice of the notification shall be made by persons, the bailiff and the notifier, without any interest to obtain knowledge of the act by the notificatario: Only the notifier, in fact may request the bailiff to personally make the notification and, when they do not, the bailiff may, at its discretion, choose the one o l’altro modo di notificazione (sentenza n. 346 del 1998).
5.3. Nell’attuale sistema normativo si è dunque verificata una discrasia, ai fini dell’individuazione della data di perfezionamento della notifica per il destinatario, tra la disciplina legislativa della notificazione a mezzo posta, dettata dal novellato art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982 – dove le esigenze di certezza nella individuazione della data di perfezionamento del procedimento notificatorio, di celerità nel completamento del relativo iter e di effettività delle garanzie di difesa e di contraddittorio sono assicurate dalla previsione che la notificazione si ha per eseguita decorsi dieci giorni dalla data di spedizione della lettera raccomandata informativa or from the date of withdrawal of the bow, whichever is earlier - the discipline and art. 140 cod. proc. Civ. in which the living law, for purposes of perfection of the notification to the recipient, emphasizes, for the sake of certainty, the single shipment of mail, is recovering well after receiving the recommended ex, be annexed to the notified , or with the interim or final consolidation of the effects occurred early in the meantime (Court of Cassation, Joint Sections, January 13, 2005, No. 458), or in terms of intervening further evidence of the proceedings notificatorio (Supreme Court, Sections united, January 14, 2008, n. 627). Clearly
that the contested provision, as interpreted by the living law, by the time limits for protection from the courts of the recipient to a date before the concrete of the knowability notified to him, violates the constitutional principles invoked by the court, for no reasonable balance between the interests of the notifier, which now no longer lies with the risks at the time of the procedure notificatorio, and those of the recipient in a matter in which, however, guarantees of defense and protection of an adversarial process must be based on actual charges and equal, and the unjustified unequal treatment with regard to this case, normatively comparable, the notificazione di atti giudiziari a mezzo posta, disciplinata dall’art. 8 della legge n. 890 del 1982.
Deve pertanto essere dichiarata l’illegittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 cod. proc. civ., nella parte in cui prevede che la notifica si perfeziona, per il destinatario, con la spedizione della raccomandata informativa, anziché con il ricevimento della stessa o, comunque, decorsi dieci giorni dalla relativa spedizione.
per questi motivi
LA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
riuniti i giudizi,
1) dichiara inammissibile la questione di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 140 del codice di procedura civile, sollevata, in riferimento agli artt. 111, primo e secondo comma, 3, primo comma, and 24, second paragraph of the Constitution, the Ordinary Court of Bologna with the order mentioned in the inscription;
2) declares that Article. 140 cod. proc. Civ. in so far as it provides that the notification is perfected, the consignee, the shipment of the registered information, instead of receiving the same or at least ten days after its dispatch.
Decided in Rome, the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 11 January 2010.
F.to:
AMIRANTE Francis, President
Paolo MADDALENA, Editor
Giuseppe DI PAOLA, Registrar
lodged with the Registrar January 14, 2010.
