The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, members of the Judges unanimously ruled that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms is a violation of the right of parents to educate their children according to their beliefs and a violation of freedom of religion of the pupils and consequently has condemned the Italian State for the violation of art. 2 of Protocol 1, reviewed in conjunction with art. 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The case decided
The applicant city italiana di origine finlandese, ha fatto ricorso alla Corte di Strasburgo: nel 2002 chiese all'istituto, frequentato dai suoi due figli, di togliere i crocefissi dalle aule in nome del principio di laicità dello Stato ma la direzione della scuola rispose negativamente
La questione giunse anche all’attenzione della Corte Costituzionale, sollevata dal TAR del Veneto, adito dalla ricorrente, che, senza entrare nel merito si è dichiarata incompetente in quanto l’oggetto dell’impugnazione riguardava un regolamento scolastico, quindi, non avente la forza di legge e, pertanto, sottratto al giudizio della stessa Corte.
Il fascicolo è quindi tornato al Tribunale amministrativo regionale, che nel 2005 ha a sua volta respinto il ricorso, sostenendo che il crocifisso è simbolo della storia e della cultura italiana e di conseguenza dell'identità del Paese, ed è il simbolo dei principi di eguaglianza, libertà e tolleranza e del secolarismo dello Stato, decisione confermata 2006, dal Consiglio di Stato
Di contrario avviso i giudici di Strasburgo, con la sentenza in epigrafe, respingono tutte le argomentazioni esposte dal Governo italiano La Corte Europea ha stabilito che la presenza del crocefisso, che è impossibile non notare nelle aule scolastiche potrebbe essere facilmente interpretata dagli studenti di tutte le età come un simbolo religioso. Avvertirebbero così di essere educati in un ambiente scolastico che ha il marchio di una data religione. Tutto questo, potrebbe essere incoraggiante per gli studenti religiosi, ma fastidioso per i ragazzi che praticano altre religioni, in particolare se appartengono a minoranze religiose o sono atei. Non convince i giudici di Strasburgo come l'esposizione, nelle classi delle scuole statali, di un simbolo che può essere ragionevolmente associato con il cattolicesimo, possa servire al pluralismo educativo che è essenziale per la conservazione di una società democratica così come è stata concepita dalla Convenzione europea dei diritti umani, un pluralismo che è riconosciuto dalla Corte costituzionale italiana. Tanto premesso la Corte di Strasburgo ha accolto il ricorso, contestando al Governo Italiano la violazione dell’art. 2, del Protocol No. 1, revised in conjunction with art. 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and ordered to pay a financial loss in the amount of € 5000 payable to the applicant within three months of this decision
The case decided
The applicant city italiana di origine finlandese, ha fatto ricorso alla Corte di Strasburgo: nel 2002 chiese all'istituto, frequentato dai suoi due figli, di togliere i crocefissi dalle aule in nome del principio di laicità dello Stato ma la direzione della scuola rispose negativamente
La questione giunse anche all’attenzione della Corte Costituzionale, sollevata dal TAR del Veneto, adito dalla ricorrente, che, senza entrare nel merito si è dichiarata incompetente in quanto l’oggetto dell’impugnazione riguardava un regolamento scolastico, quindi, non avente la forza di legge e, pertanto, sottratto al giudizio della stessa Corte.
Il fascicolo è quindi tornato al Tribunale amministrativo regionale, che nel 2005 ha a sua volta respinto il ricorso, sostenendo che il crocifisso è simbolo della storia e della cultura italiana e di conseguenza dell'identità del Paese, ed è il simbolo dei principi di eguaglianza, libertà e tolleranza e del secolarismo dello Stato, decisione confermata 2006, dal Consiglio di Stato
Di contrario avviso i giudici di Strasburgo, con la sentenza in epigrafe, respingono tutte le argomentazioni esposte dal Governo italiano La Corte Europea ha stabilito che la presenza del crocefisso, che è impossibile non notare nelle aule scolastiche potrebbe essere facilmente interpretata dagli studenti di tutte le età come un simbolo religioso. Avvertirebbero così di essere educati in un ambiente scolastico che ha il marchio di una data religione. Tutto questo, potrebbe essere incoraggiante per gli studenti religiosi, ma fastidioso per i ragazzi che praticano altre religioni, in particolare se appartengono a minoranze religiose o sono atei. Non convince i giudici di Strasburgo come l'esposizione, nelle classi delle scuole statali, di un simbolo che può essere ragionevolmente associato con il cattolicesimo, possa servire al pluralismo educativo che è essenziale per la conservazione di una società democratica così come è stata concepita dalla Convenzione europea dei diritti umani, un pluralismo che è riconosciuto dalla Corte costituzionale italiana. Tanto premesso la Corte di Strasburgo ha accolto il ricorso, contestando al Governo Italiano la violazione dell’art. 2, del Protocol No. 1, revised in conjunction with art. 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and ordered to pay a financial loss in the amount of € 5000 payable to the applicant within three months of this decision
This is the first ruling of the Court Strasbourg on religious symbols in classrooms, which takes a completely different from the decisions of the Italian courts
DEUXIEME SECTION
Lautsi c. ITALY
(Application No. 30814/06) JUDGEMENT
STRASBOURG
November 3, 2009
Lautsi c. ITALY
(Application No. 30814/06) JUDGEMENT
STRASBOURG
November 3, 2009
This decision will become final in the conditions defined in Article 44 §
2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In
Lautsi c. Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Tulkens, President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Işıl Karakaş, judges,
and Sally Dollé, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2009, Delivers the following judgment, adopted on that date: PROCEDURE
1. In the case originated in an application (No. 30814/06) against the Italian Republic and of which a national of that State, Ms. Soile Lautsi ("the applicant"), petitioned the Court on July 27, 2006 Under section 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). It acts on its behalf and on behalf of her two children, Sami and Dataico Albertin.
2. The applicant was represented by N. Paoletti, a lawyer in Rome. The Italian Government ("Government") were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Spatafora and his deputy co-Agent, Mr N. Lettieri.
3. The applicant alleged that the exposure of the cross in the classrooms of public schools attended by his children was an interference incompatible with freedom of belief and religion as well as the right to education and teaching conform to his religious and philosophical convictions.
4. On 1 July 2008 the Court decided to communicate the request to the Government. Under the provisions de l'article 29 § 3 de la Convention, elle a décidé que seraient examinés en même temps la recevabilité et le bien-fondé de l'affaire.
5. Tant la requérante que le Gouvernement ont déposé des observations écrites sur le fond de l'affaire (article 59 § 1 du règlement).
EN FAIT
I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE
6. La requérante réside à Abano Terme et a deux enfants, Dataico et Sami Albertin. Ces derniers, âgés respectivement de onze et treize ans, fréquentèrent en 2001-2002 l'école publique « Istituto comprensivo statale Vittorino da Feltre », à Abano Terme.
7. Les salles de classe avaient toutes un crucifix, that the applicant considered contrary to the principle of secularism that she wanted to educate his children. She raised the issue during a meeting held April 22, 2002 by the school and argued that under the Supreme Court (Case No. 4273 of 1 March 2000), the presence of crucifixes in voting prepared for political elections had already been found to violate the principle of secularity of the state.
8. On May 27, 2002, the school management decided to let the crucifixes in classrooms.
9. 23 July 2002 the applicant appealed against this decision before the Administrative Tribunal of the region Veneto. Relying on Articles 3 and 19 of the Italian Constitution and Article 9 of the Convention, alleging infringement of the principle of secularism. In addition, it denounced the violation of the principle of impartiality of public administration (Article 97 of the Constitution). So it asked the court to seize the Constitutional Court of the constitutionality issue.
10. On October 3, 2007, the Ministry of Education adopted Directive No. 2666 which recommended that school principals to display the crucifix. It formed part in the proceedings, and argued that the situation complained of was based on Article 118 of Royal Decree No. 965 of 30 April 1924 and Article 119 of Royal Decree No. 1297 of April 26, 1928 (previous provisions of the Constitution and the agreements between Italy and the Holy See).
11. On January 14, 2004, the Administrative Court of Veneto estimates, given the principle of secularism (Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 19 and 20 of the Constitution
) that the question of constitutionality was not manifestly ill-founded and therefore appealed to the Constitutional Court. In addition, given the academic freedom and the obligation to attend school, the presence of the crucifix was placed on students, parents and teachers and promoted religion Christianity over other religions. The applicant is party to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. The Government argued that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms was an "act natural", because he was not only a religious symbol but also the "flag of the Catholic Church, which was the only church named in the Constitution (Article 7). It was therefore considered that the crucifix was a symbol of the Italian State.
12. By Order of December 15, 2004 No. 389, the Constitutional Court considered itself incompetent because the contested provisions were not included in legislation but in the regulations, which had no force of law (paragraph 26 below).
13. The proceedings before the administrative court said. By a decision of 17 March 2005 No. 1110, the Administrative Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. He believed that the crucifix was both a symbol of history and Italian culture, and therefore the Italian identity, and the symbol of the principles of equality, freedom and tolerance as well as secular state.
14. The applicant appealed to the State Council.
15. By a decree of February 13, 2006, the Council of State rejected the appeal on the grounds that the cross had become une des valeurs laïques de la Constitution italienne et représentait les valeurs de la vie civile.
II. LE DROIT ET LA PRATIQUE INTERNES PERTINENTS 16. L'obligation d'exposer le crucifix dans les salles de classe remonte à une époque antérieure à l'unité de l'Italie. En effet, aux termes de l'article 140 du décret royal no 4336 du 15 septembre 1860 du Royaume de Piémont-Sardaigne, « chaque école devra[it] sans faute être pourvue
(...) d'un crucifix ».
17. En 1861, année de naissance de l'Etat italien, le Statut du Royaume de Piémont-Sardaigne de 1848 devint le Statut italien. Il énonçait que « la religion catholique apostolique et romaine [était] the only religion of the state. Other existing religions [were] tolerated in accordance with the law. "
18. The capture of Rome by the Italian Army, 20 September 1870, following which Rome was annexed and proclaimed capital of the new Kingdom of Italy, caused a crisis in relations between the state and the Catholic Church. By Act No. 214 of 13 May 1871, the Italian state regulations unilaterally relations with the Church and the Pope gave a number of privileges to conduct regular religious activity.
19. With the advent of fascism, the state adopted a series of circulars to enforce the obligation to expose le crucifix dans les salles de classe.
La circulaire du ministère de l'Instruction publique no 68 du 22 novembre
1922 disait ceci : « Ces dernières années, dans beaucoup d'écoles primaires du Royaume l'image du Christ et le portrait du Roi ont été enlevés. Cela constitue une violation manifeste et non tolérable d'une disposition réglementaire et surtout une atteinte à la religion dominante de l'Etat ainsi qu'à l'unité de la Nation. Nous intimons alors à toutes les administrations municipales du Royaume l'ordre de rétablir dans les écoles qui en sont dépourvues les deux symboles sacrés de la foi et du sentiment national. » La circulaire du ministère de l'Instruction publique no 2134-1867 du 26 mai
1926 affirmait : « Le symbole de notre religion, sacré pour la foi ainsi que pour le sentiment national, exhorte et inspire la jeunesse studieuse, qui dans les universités et autres établissements d'enseignement supérieur aiguise son esprit et son intelligence en vue des hautes charges auxquelles elle est destinée. » 20. L'article 118 du décret royal no 965 du 30 avril 1924 (Règlement intérieur des établissements scolaires secondaires du Royaume) est ainsi libellé : « Chaque établissement scolaire doit avoir le drapeau national, chaque salle de classe l'image du crucifix et le portrait du roi ».
L'article 119 du décret royal no 1297 du 26 avril 1928 (approving the general regulation of primary education services) has the crucifix among the "necessary equipment and materials to the classrooms of schools."
National courts have held that these two provisions were still in force and applicable to this case.
21. The Lateran Pacts, signed February 11, 1929, marked the "Reconciliation" of the Italian state and the Catholic Church. Catholicism was confirmed as the official religion of the Italian State. Section 1 of the Treaty read: "Italy recognizes and reaffirms the principle enshrined in Article 1 Albertine Statute of the Kingdom of March 4, 1848, by which the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman is the only religion of the state. '22. In 1948, the Italian government adopted its republican constitution.
Article 7 of the latter explicitly recognizes that the State and the Catholic Church are, each in its order, independent and sovereign. The relationship between the state and the Catholic Church are regulated by the Lateran Pacts and modifications thereof accepted by both parties do not require constitutional revision procedure.
Article 8 states that religious denominations other than Catholic "have the right to organize according to their own statutes, as they are not opposed to the Italian legal system. " The relationship between the State and these other faiths "are fixed by law on the basis of agreements with their respective representatives."
23. The Catholic religion has changed their status following the ratification by Law No. 121 of 25 March 1985, the first provision of the Protocol Additional to the new Concordat with the Vatican on 18 February 1984 amending the Lateran Pacts of 1929. Under this provision, the principle proclaimed in the beginning by the Lateran Pacts, the Catholic religion as the only religion of the Italian State is considered no longer in force.
24. The Constitutional Court italienne dans son arrêt no 508 du 20 novembre 2000 a ainsi résumé sa jurisprudence en affirmant que des principes fondamentaux d'égalité de tous les citoyens sans distinction de religion (article 3 de la Constitution) et d'égale liberté de toutes les religions devant la loi (article 8) découle en fait que l'attitude de l'Etat doit être marquée par l'équidistance et l'impartialité, sans attacher d'importance au nombre d'adhérents d'une religion ou d'une autre (voir arrêts no 925/88 ; 440/95 ; 329/97) ou à l'ampleur des réactions sociales à la violation des droits de l'une ou de l'autre (voir arrêt no 329/97). L'égale protection de la conscience each person who joins a religion is independent of the chosen religion (see Case No. 440/95), which is not in contradiction with the possibility of a different regulation of the relationship between the state and different religions meaning of Articles 7 and 8 of the Constitution. Such a position of impartiality and equidistance reflects the principle of secularism as the Constitutional Court drew the standards of the Constitution and that kind of "supreme principle" (see Case No. 203/89, 259/90, 195 / 93, 329/97), which characterizes the state in the direction of pluralism. Beliefs, cultures and traditions to live together in equality and freedom (see Case No. 440/95).
25. In its decision No. 203 of 1989, the Constitutional Court examined the issue of non-compulsory teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools. On this occasion, she stated that the Constitution contained the principle of secularism (Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 19 and
20) and the confessional character of the state had been explicitly abandoned in 1985 under Protocol Additional to the new agreements with the Holy See.
26. The Constitutional Court asked to rule on the obligation to display the crucifix in public schools, has rendu l'ordonnance du 15 décembre 2004 no 389 (paragraphe 12 ci-dessus). Sans statuer sur le fond, elle a déclaré manifestement irrecevable la question soulevée car elle avait pour objet des dispositions réglementaires, dépourvues de force de loi, qui par conséquent échappaient à sa juridiction.
EN DROIT
I. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 2 DU PROTOCOLE No 1 EXAMINÉ CONJOINTEMENT AVEC L'ARTICLE 9 DE LA CONVENTION 27. La requérante allègue en son nom et au nom de ses enfants que l'exposition de la croix dans l'école publique fréquentée par ceux-ci a constitué une ingérence incompatible avec son droit de leur assurer une éducation et un enseignement conformes à ses convictions religieuses et philosophiques au sens de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1, disposition qui est libellée comme suit :
« Nul ne peut se voir refuser le droit à l'instruction. L'Etat, dans l'exercice des fonctions qu'il assumera dans le domaine de l'éducation et de l'enseignement, respectera le droit des parents d'assurer cette éducation et cet enseignement conformément à leurs convictions religieuses et philosophiques. » Par ailleurs, la requérante allègue que l'exposition de la croix a méconnu également sa liberté de conviction et de religion protégée par l'article 9 de la Convention, qui énonce :
« 1. Toute personne a droit à la liberté of thought, conscience and religion: this right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom to manifest religion or belief individually or collectively, in public or in private, through worship, teaching , practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, public safety, protection order , health or morals or the protection of rights and freedoms of others. " 28. Le Gouvernement conteste cette thèse.
A. Sur la recevabilité
29. La Cour constate que les griefs formulés par la requérante ne sont pas manifestement mal fondés au sens de l'article 35 § 3 de la Convention.
Elle relève par ailleurs qu'ils ne se heurtent à aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilité. Il convient donc de les déclarer recevables.
B. Sur le fond
1. Arguments des parties
a) La requérante
30. La requérante a fourni l'historique des dispositions pertinentes. Elle observe que l'exposition du crucifix se fonde, selon les juridictions nationales, sur des dispositions de 1924 et 1928 qui sont considérées comme étant toujours en vigueur, bien predating the Italian Constitution and the 1984 agreement with the Holy See and the Additional Protocol thereto. However, the contested provisions were beyond the control of constitutionality, because the Constitutional Court could have ruled on their compatibility with fundamental principles of Italian law because of their regulatory nature.
The provisions in question are the heritage of a religious conception of the state that now faces the duty of a secular one and ignores the rights protected by the Convention. There is a "religious question" in Italy, because, by requiring exposing le crucifix dans les salles de classe, l'Etat accorde à la religion catholique une position privilégiée qui se traduirait par une ingérence étatique dans le droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion de la requérante et de ses enfants et dans le droit de la requérante d'éduquer ses enfants conformément à ses convictions morales et religieuses, ainsi que par une forme de discrimination à l'égard des non-catholiques.
31. Selon la requérante, le crucifix a en réalité, surtout et avant tout, une connotation religieuse. Le fait que la croix ait d'autres « clés de lecture » n'entraîne pas la perte de sa principale connotation, qui est religieuse. Favouring one religion
exposing a symbol gives the impression to public school students - including children of the applicant - that the state adheres to a specific religious belief.
While in a state of law, no one should perceive the state as more akin to a religion as another, especially not those who are more vulnerable because of their young age.
32. For the applicant, this has implications for inter alia an undeniable pressure on minors and gives the feeling that the state is far from those who do not identify with this confession. The notion of secularism signifie que l'Etat doit être neutre et faire preuve d'équidistance vis-à-vis des religions, car il ne devrait pas être perçu comme étant plus proche de certains citoyens que d'autres.
L'Etat devrait garantir à tous les citoyens la liberté de conscience, en commençant par une instruction publique apte à forger l'autonomie et la liberté de pensée de la personne, dans le respect des droits garantis par la Convention.
33. Quant au point de savoir si un enseignant serait libre d'exposer d'autres symboles religieux dans une salle de classe, la réponse serait négative, vu l'absence de dispositions le permettant.
b) Le Gouvernement
34. Le Gouvernement observe d'emblée that the issue raised by this application beyond the strictly legal framework to invade the field of philosophy. It is indeed to determine whether the presence of a symbol that has a religious origin and meaning is itself a factor likely to affect individual liberties in a manner inconsistent with the Convention.
35. If the cross is certainly a religious symbol, it takes on other meanings. It would also have an ethical significance, understandable and meaningful regardless of adherence to religious tradition or history as it speaks of principles that can be shared outside the faith Christian (non-violence, equal dignity of all human beings, justice and sharing, the primacy of the individual over the group and the importance of freedom of choice, separation of politics from religion, love of neighbor up to forgiveness of enemies ). Certainly, the values \u200b\u200bthat underpin democratic societies today have their immediate origin in the thought of authors nonbelievers, if not opposed to Christianity. However, the thought of these authors would be nourished by Christian philosophy, not least because of their upbringing and cultural milieu in which they were formed and they live. In conclusion, the democratic values \u200b\u200bof today plunge their roots in the more distant past, that the Gospel message. The message of the cross would be a humanist message, which can be read independently of its religious dimension, consisting of a set of principles and values \u200b\u200bthat form the basis of our democracies.
The cross reference to this message, it would be perfectly compatible with secularism and accessible to non-Christians and nonbelievers, who might accept it since it would evoke the distant origins of these principles and values . In conclusion, the symbol of the cross can be seen as devoid of religious significance, its exposure in a public does not in itself constitute an infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.
36. According to the Government, this conclusion is confirmed by analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court which requires a much more active interference that mere exposure of a symbol for a finding of infringement of rights and freedoms. Thus, it is an active interference that resulted in the violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in the case Folgerø (Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], No. 15472/02, ECHR 2007-VIII).
In this case, it is not the freedom to join or not to a religion that is at stake, because in Italy this freedom is fully guaranteed. It This is not the freedom to practice religion or not practice any, the crucifix is \u200b\u200bin fact explained in the classroom but it is not required of teachers or students to send him any sign of hello, reverence or mere recognition, let alone recite prayers in class. In fact, he did not even ask them to pay any attention to the crucifix.
Finally, the freedom to educate children according to parents' beliefs is not at issue: Education in Italy is totally secular and pluralistic curricula contain no reference to any particular religion and religious instruction is optional.
37. Referring to Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen (December 7, 1976, Series A, No. 23), where the Court found no violation, the Government argues that, whatever its evocative power, a image is not comparable to the impact of an active behavior, daily and extended in time as teaching. In addition, it would be possible to educate their children to private school or at home by tutors.
38. The national authorities have considerable discretion in matters as complex and delicate, closely related the culture and history. Exposure of a religious symbol in public places would not exceed the margin of appreciation left to States.
39. This is especially true in Europe there are a variety of attitudes on the subject. For example, in Greece all civilian and military ceremonies include the presence and active participation of an Orthodox clergyman, moreover, Good Friday, the national mourning was declared and all offices and shops are closed, as in Alsace.
40. According to the Government, the exposure of the cross does not undermine the secular state, a principle enshrined in the Constitution and in the agreements with the Holy See. She would not indicate a preference for a religion, since it would recall a cultural tradition and human values \u200b\u200bshared by people other than Christians. In conclusion, exposure of the cross does not disregard the duty of impartiality and neutrality of the state.
41. Moreover, there is no European consensus on how to effectively interpret the concept of secularism, so that states would have a wider discretion in the matter. Specifically, if there is a European consensus on the principle of secularism de l'Etat, il n'y en aurait pas sur ses implications concrètes et sur sa mise en œuvre. Le Gouvernement demande à la Cour de faire preuve de prudence et retenue et de s'abstenir par conséquent de donner un contenu précis allant jusqu'à interdire la simple exposition de symboles. Sinon, elle donnerait un contenu matériel prédéterminé au principe de laïcité, ce qui irait à l'encontre de la légitime diversité des approches nationales et conduirait à des conséquences imprévisibles.
42. Le Gouvernement ne soutient pas qu'il soit nécessaire, opportun ou souhaitable de maintenir le crucifix dans les salles de classe, mais le choix de l'y maintenir ou non relèverait du policy and thus meet the criteria of opportunity, not legality. In the historical development of law outlined by the complainant, that the Government does not dispute, it should be understood that Italy, though secular, has freely decided to keep the crucifix in classrooms for various reasons, including the need to find a compromise with the Christian-based parties representing an essential part of the population and the religious sentiment of it.
43. Whether a teacher would be free to expose other religious symbols in classrooms, no provision would ban.
44. In conclusion, the Government asked the Court to dismiss the complaint.
c) The third party
45. The Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) disputes the arguments of the respondent Government.
The cross, the crucifix and more, can only be seen as religious symbols. The GHM also challenges the assertion that we must see the cross in something other than religious symbol and that the cross is the bearer of human values, he believes that such position is offensive to the Church. In addition, the Italian Government would not have even indicated a single non-Christian who would agree with this theory. Finally, other religions would see in la croix qu'un symbole religieux.
46. Si l'on suit l'argument du Gouvernement selon lequel l'exposition du crucifix ne demande ni salut, ni attention, il y aurait lieu de se demander alors pourquoi le crucifix est exposé. L'exposition d'un tel symbole pourrait être perçue comme la vénération institutionnelle de celui-ci.
A cet égard, le GHM observe que, selon les principes directeurs de Tolède sur l'enseignement relatif aux religions et convictions dans les écoles publiques (Conseil d'experts sur la liberté de religion et de conviction de l'organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (« OSCE »)), la présence d'un tel symbole dans une école publique may constitute a form of implicit teaching of a religion, for example by giving the impression that this particular religion is favored over others. If the Court in Case Folgerø said that participation in religious activities can affect children, then, by GHM, the exhibition of religious symbols may also have one. We must also think of situations where children or their parents may fear retaliation if they chose to protest.
3. Findings of the Court
d) General principles
47. Regarding the interpretation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in the exercise of the functions that the state assumes in the field of education and teaching, the Court identified in its jurisprudence the principles outlined below are relevant in this case (see in particular Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark
, Judgement of 7 December 1976, Series A, No. 23, pp. 24-28, § § 50-54, and Campbell Cosans v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 25 February 1982, Series At No. 48, pp. 16-18, § § 36-37, Valsamis v. Greece, Judgement of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 VI, pp. 2323-2324, § § 25-28, and Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no 15472/02, ECHR 2007-VIII § 84).
(a) You must read both sentences of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the light not only from each other, but also, in particular, Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention.
(b) is the fundamental right to education that is grafted the right of parents to respect their religious and philosophical convictions and the first sentence does not distinguish any more than the second, between public education and private education. The second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is to safeguard the possibility of pluralism in education, essential to the preservation of "society" as conceived by the Convention. Due the power of the modern state, it is mainly through public education that needs to achieve this goal.
(c) Respect for parents 'convictions should be possible within the framework of an education capable of providing a school environment open and inclusive rather than exclusion, regardless of students' backgrounds, beliefs religious or ethnic origin.
The school should not be the scene of proselytizing or preaching, it should be a meeting place of different religions and philosophical convictions, where students can learn about their thoughts and traditions respectives.
(d) La seconde phrase de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 implique que l'Etat, en s'acquittant des fonctions assumées par lui en matière d'éducation et d'enseignement, veille à ce que les informations ou connaissances figurant dans les programmes soient diffusées de manière objective, critique et pluraliste. Elle lui interdit de poursuivre un but d'endoctrinement qui puisse être considéré comme ne respectant pas les convictions religieuses et philosophiques des parents. Là se place la limite à ne pas dépasser.
(e) Le respect des convictions religieuses des parents et des croyances des enfants implique le droit de croire en une religion ou de ne croire en aucune religion. The freedom to believe and the freedom not to believe (negative freedom) are both protected by Article 9 of the Convention (see, in terms of section 11, Young, James and Webster v.
UK, August 13, 1981, § § 52-57, Series A No. 44).
The duty of neutrality and impartiality of the state is incompatible with any discretion on the part of it as to the legitimacy of religious beliefs or ways of expressing them. In the education context, neutrality should ensure pluralism (Folgerø, § 84).
b) Application of these principles
48. For the Court, these considerations lead to the obligation of the State to refrain from imposing, directly or indirectly, beliefs, places where people are dependent on him or in places where they are particularly vulnerable. The schooling of children is a particularly sensitive because, in this case, the binding power of the state is imposed on spirits that are still missing (depending on level of maturity of the child) the ability to take critical distance report to the message under a preferential choice expressed by the State in religious matters.
49. By applying the principles above to this case, the Court must consider whether the respondent State, in imposing the exposure of crucifixes in classrooms, oversaw the exercise of its functions of education and learning that knowledge is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic and respected the religious and philosophical convictions of parents, in accordance with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
50. To examine this question, the Court will take into account the particular nature of religious symbol and its impact on students at a young age, especially children of the applicant. Indeed, in countries where the vast majority of the population belong to a particular religion, the manifestation of the rites and symbols of this religion without restriction of place and manner, may constitute a pressure on students who do not practice that religion or those who adhere to another religion (Karaduman v. Turkey, decision of the Commission on May 3, 1993).
51. Government (paragraphs 34-44 above) justifies the requirement (or does) to display the crucifix when referring to positive moral message of the Christian faith, which transcends the secular constitutional values, the role of religion in Italian history as well as rooting it in the tradition of the country. He attributes the crucifix neutral and secular significance with reference to the history and tradition of Italy, closely related to Christianity. The Government argued that the crucifix is \u200b\u200ba religious symbol but it may also represent other values \u200b\u200b(see Administrative Court of Veneto, No. 1110 of March 17, 2005, § 16, paragraph 13 above).
In the opinion of the Court, the symbol of the crucifix has a plurality of meanings including the religious meaning is predominant.
52. The Court considers that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms goes beyond the use of symbols in specific historical contexts. She also felt that le caractère traditionnel, dans le sens social et historique, d'un texte utilisé par les parlementaires pour prêter serment ne privait pas le serment de sa nature religieuse (Buscarini et autres c. Saint-Marin [GC], no 24645/94, CEDH 1999 I).
53. La requérante allègue que le symbole heurte ses convictions et viole le droit de ses enfants de ne pas professer la religion catholique. Ses convictions atteignent un degré de sérieux et de cohérence suffisant pour que la présence obligatoire du crucifix puisse être raisonnablement comprise par elle comme étant en conflit avec celles-ci. L'intéressée voit dans l'exposition du crucifix le signe que l'Etat se range du côté de la religion catholique. This is the meaning adopted officially in the Catholic Church, the crucifix which assigns an underlying message.
Therefore, the apprehension of the applicant is not arbitrary.
54. The convictions of Ms Lautsi also concern the impact of exposure of the crucifix on his children (paragraph 32 above), age at the time of eleven and thirteen. The Court recognizes that, as stated, it is impossible not to notice the crucifix in classrooms. In the context of public education, it is necessarily perceived as an integral part of school and can therefore be considered a "powerful external symbol" (Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), No. 42393/98, ECHR 2001 V).
55. The presence of the crucifix can be easily interpreted by students of all ages as a religious symbol and they will feel educated in a school environment characterized by a particular religion.
What may be encouraging some students to religious, can be emotionally disturbing for pupils from other religions or those who profess no religion. This risk is especially prevalent among students belonging to religious minorities. Negative freedom is not limited to the absence of religious services or instruction religious. It extends to the practices and symbols expressing in particular or in general, a belief, a religion or atheism. This negative right deserves special protection if the State expresses a belief and if the person is placed in a situation she can not escape or just by making efforts and sacrifice of proportion.
56. The exposure of one or more religious symbols can not be justified either by the request of other parents who want religious education according to their beliefs, nor, as the Government argues, by the necessity of a necessary compromise with political parties of Christian inspiration. Le respect des convictions de parents en matière d'éducation doit prendre en compte le respect des convictions des autres parents. L'Etat est tenu à la neutralité confessionnelle dans le cadre de l'éducation publique obligatoire où la présence aux cours est requise sans considération de religion et qui doit chercher à inculquer aux élèves une pensée critique.
La Cour ne voit pas comment l'exposition, dans des salles de classe des écoles publiques, d'un symbole qu'il est raisonnable d'associer au catholicisme (la religion majoritaire en Italie) pourrait servir le pluralisme éducatif qui est essentiel à la préservation d'une « société démocratique » telle que conceived by the Convention, pluralism has been recognized by the Constitutional Court law (see paragraph 24).
57. The Court considers that the compulsory display of a symbol of a particular faith in the exercise of the public in relation to specific situations under government control, particularly in classrooms, restricts the right of parents to educate their children according to their beliefs and the right of schoolchildren to believe or disbelieve. The Court considers that this constitutes a violation of these rights because the restrictions are inconsistent with the duty of the State to respect the neutrality in the exercise of la fonction publique, en particulier dans le domaine de l'éducation.
58. Partant, il y a eu violation de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 conjointement avec l'article 9 de la Convention.
II. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 14 DE LA CONVENTION 59. La requérante soutient que l'ingérence qu'elle a dénoncée sous l'angle de l'article 9 de la Convention et de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 méconnaît également le principe de non-discrimination, consacré par l'article 14 de la Convention.
60. Le Gouvernement combat cette thèse.
61. La Cour constate que ce grief n'est pas manifestement mal fondé au sens de l'article 35 § 3 de la Convention. Elle relève par ailleurs it does not conflict with any other ground of inadmissibility. It should therefore be declared admissible.
62. However, given the circumstances of this case and the reasoning that led her to find a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 9 of the Convention (see paragraph 58 above), the Court believes that there is no need to consider the case of addition in terms of section 14, either alone or combined with the above provisions.
III. ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 63. Under Article 41 of the Convention, "If the Court finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols, and if the law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to this violation, the Court awarded the injured party, if necessary, afford just satisfaction. "A. Damage 64. The applicant seeks the payment of a sum of at least EUR 10 000 for moral damages.
65. The Government considers that a finding of violation would be sufficient.
alternative, he believes that the amount claimed was excessive and unsupported and seeks dismissal or reduction in equity.
66. Since the Government has not declared his willingness to revise the provisions governing the presence of the crucifix in classrooms, the Court considers that, unlike what happened in the case Folgerø and others (cited above, § 109), the finding of a violation does not suffice in this case. Therefore, acting in equity, it gives 5 000 EUR to non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs
67. The applicant is requesting 5 000 EUR for costs and expenses incurred in the Strasbourg proceedings.
68. The Government notes that the applicant has not substantiated his claim, and suggests the rejection of it.
69. According to the jurisprudence of the Court, an applicant can not obtain reimbursement for costs and expenses in so far as they have actually and necessity and reasonableness of their rates. In this case, the applicant has produced any evidence to support his claim. The Court therefore decided to reject it.
C. Default interest
70. The Court considers it appropriate to base the rate of interest on the interest rate on the marginal lending facility from the European Central Bank plus three percentage points.
BY THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Said there had been a violation of Article 2 du Protocole no 1 examiné conjointement avec l'article 9 de la Convention ;
3. Dit qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner le grief tiré de l'article 14 pris isolément ou combiné avec l'article 9 de la Convention et l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 ;
4. Dit
a) que l'Etat défendeur doit verser à la requérante, dans les trois mois à compter du jour où l'arrêt sera devenu définitif conformément à l'article 44 § 2 de la Convention, 5 000 EUR (cinq mille euros), pour dommage moral, plus tout montant pouvant être dû à titre d'impôt ;
b) qu'à compter de l'expiration dudit délai et jusqu'au versement, ce montant sera à majorer simple interest at a rate equal to the marginal lending facility from the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Rejects the claim for just satisfaction for the remainder.
Done in French, and notified in writing by November 3, 2009, pursuant to Article 77 § § 2 and 3 of the Regulation.
Sally Dollé Tulkens
Clerk President
2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In
Lautsi c. Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Tulkens, President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Işıl Karakaş, judges,
and Sally Dollé, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2009, Delivers the following judgment, adopted on that date: PROCEDURE
1. In the case originated in an application (No. 30814/06) against the Italian Republic and of which a national of that State, Ms. Soile Lautsi ("the applicant"), petitioned the Court on July 27, 2006 Under section 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). It acts on its behalf and on behalf of her two children, Sami and Dataico Albertin.
2. The applicant was represented by N. Paoletti, a lawyer in Rome. The Italian Government ("Government") were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Spatafora and his deputy co-Agent, Mr N. Lettieri.
3. The applicant alleged that the exposure of the cross in the classrooms of public schools attended by his children was an interference incompatible with freedom of belief and religion as well as the right to education and teaching conform to his religious and philosophical convictions.
4. On 1 July 2008 the Court decided to communicate the request to the Government. Under the provisions de l'article 29 § 3 de la Convention, elle a décidé que seraient examinés en même temps la recevabilité et le bien-fondé de l'affaire.
5. Tant la requérante que le Gouvernement ont déposé des observations écrites sur le fond de l'affaire (article 59 § 1 du règlement).
EN FAIT
I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE
6. La requérante réside à Abano Terme et a deux enfants, Dataico et Sami Albertin. Ces derniers, âgés respectivement de onze et treize ans, fréquentèrent en 2001-2002 l'école publique « Istituto comprensivo statale Vittorino da Feltre », à Abano Terme.
7. Les salles de classe avaient toutes un crucifix, that the applicant considered contrary to the principle of secularism that she wanted to educate his children. She raised the issue during a meeting held April 22, 2002 by the school and argued that under the Supreme Court (Case No. 4273 of 1 March 2000), the presence of crucifixes in voting prepared for political elections had already been found to violate the principle of secularity of the state.
8. On May 27, 2002, the school management decided to let the crucifixes in classrooms.
9. 23 July 2002 the applicant appealed against this decision before the Administrative Tribunal of the region Veneto. Relying on Articles 3 and 19 of the Italian Constitution and Article 9 of the Convention, alleging infringement of the principle of secularism. In addition, it denounced the violation of the principle of impartiality of public administration (Article 97 of the Constitution). So it asked the court to seize the Constitutional Court of the constitutionality issue.
10. On October 3, 2007, the Ministry of Education adopted Directive No. 2666 which recommended that school principals to display the crucifix. It formed part in the proceedings, and argued that the situation complained of was based on Article 118 of Royal Decree No. 965 of 30 April 1924 and Article 119 of Royal Decree No. 1297 of April 26, 1928 (previous provisions of the Constitution and the agreements between Italy and the Holy See).
11. On January 14, 2004, the Administrative Court of Veneto estimates, given the principle of secularism (Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 19 and 20 of the Constitution
) that the question of constitutionality was not manifestly ill-founded and therefore appealed to the Constitutional Court. In addition, given the academic freedom and the obligation to attend school, the presence of the crucifix was placed on students, parents and teachers and promoted religion Christianity over other religions. The applicant is party to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. The Government argued that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms was an "act natural", because he was not only a religious symbol but also the "flag of the Catholic Church, which was the only church named in the Constitution (Article 7). It was therefore considered that the crucifix was a symbol of the Italian State.
12. By Order of December 15, 2004 No. 389, the Constitutional Court considered itself incompetent because the contested provisions were not included in legislation but in the regulations, which had no force of law (paragraph 26 below).
13. The proceedings before the administrative court said. By a decision of 17 March 2005 No. 1110, the Administrative Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. He believed that the crucifix was both a symbol of history and Italian culture, and therefore the Italian identity, and the symbol of the principles of equality, freedom and tolerance as well as secular state.
14. The applicant appealed to the State Council.
15. By a decree of February 13, 2006, the Council of State rejected the appeal on the grounds that the cross had become une des valeurs laïques de la Constitution italienne et représentait les valeurs de la vie civile.
II. LE DROIT ET LA PRATIQUE INTERNES PERTINENTS 16. L'obligation d'exposer le crucifix dans les salles de classe remonte à une époque antérieure à l'unité de l'Italie. En effet, aux termes de l'article 140 du décret royal no 4336 du 15 septembre 1860 du Royaume de Piémont-Sardaigne, « chaque école devra[it] sans faute être pourvue
(...) d'un crucifix ».
17. En 1861, année de naissance de l'Etat italien, le Statut du Royaume de Piémont-Sardaigne de 1848 devint le Statut italien. Il énonçait que « la religion catholique apostolique et romaine [était] the only religion of the state. Other existing religions [were] tolerated in accordance with the law. "
18. The capture of Rome by the Italian Army, 20 September 1870, following which Rome was annexed and proclaimed capital of the new Kingdom of Italy, caused a crisis in relations between the state and the Catholic Church. By Act No. 214 of 13 May 1871, the Italian state regulations unilaterally relations with the Church and the Pope gave a number of privileges to conduct regular religious activity.
19. With the advent of fascism, the state adopted a series of circulars to enforce the obligation to expose le crucifix dans les salles de classe.
La circulaire du ministère de l'Instruction publique no 68 du 22 novembre
1922 disait ceci : « Ces dernières années, dans beaucoup d'écoles primaires du Royaume l'image du Christ et le portrait du Roi ont été enlevés. Cela constitue une violation manifeste et non tolérable d'une disposition réglementaire et surtout une atteinte à la religion dominante de l'Etat ainsi qu'à l'unité de la Nation. Nous intimons alors à toutes les administrations municipales du Royaume l'ordre de rétablir dans les écoles qui en sont dépourvues les deux symboles sacrés de la foi et du sentiment national. » La circulaire du ministère de l'Instruction publique no 2134-1867 du 26 mai
1926 affirmait : « Le symbole de notre religion, sacré pour la foi ainsi que pour le sentiment national, exhorte et inspire la jeunesse studieuse, qui dans les universités et autres établissements d'enseignement supérieur aiguise son esprit et son intelligence en vue des hautes charges auxquelles elle est destinée. » 20. L'article 118 du décret royal no 965 du 30 avril 1924 (Règlement intérieur des établissements scolaires secondaires du Royaume) est ainsi libellé : « Chaque établissement scolaire doit avoir le drapeau national, chaque salle de classe l'image du crucifix et le portrait du roi ».
L'article 119 du décret royal no 1297 du 26 avril 1928 (approving the general regulation of primary education services) has the crucifix among the "necessary equipment and materials to the classrooms of schools."
National courts have held that these two provisions were still in force and applicable to this case.
21. The Lateran Pacts, signed February 11, 1929, marked the "Reconciliation" of the Italian state and the Catholic Church. Catholicism was confirmed as the official religion of the Italian State. Section 1 of the Treaty read: "Italy recognizes and reaffirms the principle enshrined in Article 1 Albertine Statute of the Kingdom of March 4, 1848, by which the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman is the only religion of the state. '22. In 1948, the Italian government adopted its republican constitution.
Article 7 of the latter explicitly recognizes that the State and the Catholic Church are, each in its order, independent and sovereign. The relationship between the state and the Catholic Church are regulated by the Lateran Pacts and modifications thereof accepted by both parties do not require constitutional revision procedure.
Article 8 states that religious denominations other than Catholic "have the right to organize according to their own statutes, as they are not opposed to the Italian legal system. " The relationship between the State and these other faiths "are fixed by law on the basis of agreements with their respective representatives."
23. The Catholic religion has changed their status following the ratification by Law No. 121 of 25 March 1985, the first provision of the Protocol Additional to the new Concordat with the Vatican on 18 February 1984 amending the Lateran Pacts of 1929. Under this provision, the principle proclaimed in the beginning by the Lateran Pacts, the Catholic religion as the only religion of the Italian State is considered no longer in force.
24. The Constitutional Court italienne dans son arrêt no 508 du 20 novembre 2000 a ainsi résumé sa jurisprudence en affirmant que des principes fondamentaux d'égalité de tous les citoyens sans distinction de religion (article 3 de la Constitution) et d'égale liberté de toutes les religions devant la loi (article 8) découle en fait que l'attitude de l'Etat doit être marquée par l'équidistance et l'impartialité, sans attacher d'importance au nombre d'adhérents d'une religion ou d'une autre (voir arrêts no 925/88 ; 440/95 ; 329/97) ou à l'ampleur des réactions sociales à la violation des droits de l'une ou de l'autre (voir arrêt no 329/97). L'égale protection de la conscience each person who joins a religion is independent of the chosen religion (see Case No. 440/95), which is not in contradiction with the possibility of a different regulation of the relationship between the state and different religions meaning of Articles 7 and 8 of the Constitution. Such a position of impartiality and equidistance reflects the principle of secularism as the Constitutional Court drew the standards of the Constitution and that kind of "supreme principle" (see Case No. 203/89, 259/90, 195 / 93, 329/97), which characterizes the state in the direction of pluralism. Beliefs, cultures and traditions to live together in equality and freedom (see Case No. 440/95).
25. In its decision No. 203 of 1989, the Constitutional Court examined the issue of non-compulsory teaching of the Catholic religion in public schools. On this occasion, she stated that the Constitution contained the principle of secularism (Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 19 and
20) and the confessional character of the state had been explicitly abandoned in 1985 under Protocol Additional to the new agreements with the Holy See.
26. The Constitutional Court asked to rule on the obligation to display the crucifix in public schools, has rendu l'ordonnance du 15 décembre 2004 no 389 (paragraphe 12 ci-dessus). Sans statuer sur le fond, elle a déclaré manifestement irrecevable la question soulevée car elle avait pour objet des dispositions réglementaires, dépourvues de force de loi, qui par conséquent échappaient à sa juridiction.
EN DROIT
I. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 2 DU PROTOCOLE No 1 EXAMINÉ CONJOINTEMENT AVEC L'ARTICLE 9 DE LA CONVENTION 27. La requérante allègue en son nom et au nom de ses enfants que l'exposition de la croix dans l'école publique fréquentée par ceux-ci a constitué une ingérence incompatible avec son droit de leur assurer une éducation et un enseignement conformes à ses convictions religieuses et philosophiques au sens de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1, disposition qui est libellée comme suit :
« Nul ne peut se voir refuser le droit à l'instruction. L'Etat, dans l'exercice des fonctions qu'il assumera dans le domaine de l'éducation et de l'enseignement, respectera le droit des parents d'assurer cette éducation et cet enseignement conformément à leurs convictions religieuses et philosophiques. » Par ailleurs, la requérante allègue que l'exposition de la croix a méconnu également sa liberté de conviction et de religion protégée par l'article 9 de la Convention, qui énonce :
« 1. Toute personne a droit à la liberté of thought, conscience and religion: this right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom to manifest religion or belief individually or collectively, in public or in private, through worship, teaching , practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, public safety, protection order , health or morals or the protection of rights and freedoms of others. " 28. Le Gouvernement conteste cette thèse.
A. Sur la recevabilité
29. La Cour constate que les griefs formulés par la requérante ne sont pas manifestement mal fondés au sens de l'article 35 § 3 de la Convention.
Elle relève par ailleurs qu'ils ne se heurtent à aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilité. Il convient donc de les déclarer recevables.
B. Sur le fond
1. Arguments des parties
a) La requérante
30. La requérante a fourni l'historique des dispositions pertinentes. Elle observe que l'exposition du crucifix se fonde, selon les juridictions nationales, sur des dispositions de 1924 et 1928 qui sont considérées comme étant toujours en vigueur, bien predating the Italian Constitution and the 1984 agreement with the Holy See and the Additional Protocol thereto. However, the contested provisions were beyond the control of constitutionality, because the Constitutional Court could have ruled on their compatibility with fundamental principles of Italian law because of their regulatory nature.
The provisions in question are the heritage of a religious conception of the state that now faces the duty of a secular one and ignores the rights protected by the Convention. There is a "religious question" in Italy, because, by requiring exposing le crucifix dans les salles de classe, l'Etat accorde à la religion catholique une position privilégiée qui se traduirait par une ingérence étatique dans le droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion de la requérante et de ses enfants et dans le droit de la requérante d'éduquer ses enfants conformément à ses convictions morales et religieuses, ainsi que par une forme de discrimination à l'égard des non-catholiques.
31. Selon la requérante, le crucifix a en réalité, surtout et avant tout, une connotation religieuse. Le fait que la croix ait d'autres « clés de lecture » n'entraîne pas la perte de sa principale connotation, qui est religieuse. Favouring one religion
exposing a symbol gives the impression to public school students - including children of the applicant - that the state adheres to a specific religious belief.
While in a state of law, no one should perceive the state as more akin to a religion as another, especially not those who are more vulnerable because of their young age.
32. For the applicant, this has implications for inter alia an undeniable pressure on minors and gives the feeling that the state is far from those who do not identify with this confession. The notion of secularism signifie que l'Etat doit être neutre et faire preuve d'équidistance vis-à-vis des religions, car il ne devrait pas être perçu comme étant plus proche de certains citoyens que d'autres.
L'Etat devrait garantir à tous les citoyens la liberté de conscience, en commençant par une instruction publique apte à forger l'autonomie et la liberté de pensée de la personne, dans le respect des droits garantis par la Convention.
33. Quant au point de savoir si un enseignant serait libre d'exposer d'autres symboles religieux dans une salle de classe, la réponse serait négative, vu l'absence de dispositions le permettant.
b) Le Gouvernement
34. Le Gouvernement observe d'emblée that the issue raised by this application beyond the strictly legal framework to invade the field of philosophy. It is indeed to determine whether the presence of a symbol that has a religious origin and meaning is itself a factor likely to affect individual liberties in a manner inconsistent with the Convention.
35. If the cross is certainly a religious symbol, it takes on other meanings. It would also have an ethical significance, understandable and meaningful regardless of adherence to religious tradition or history as it speaks of principles that can be shared outside the faith Christian (non-violence, equal dignity of all human beings, justice and sharing, the primacy of the individual over the group and the importance of freedom of choice, separation of politics from religion, love of neighbor up to forgiveness of enemies ). Certainly, the values \u200b\u200bthat underpin democratic societies today have their immediate origin in the thought of authors nonbelievers, if not opposed to Christianity. However, the thought of these authors would be nourished by Christian philosophy, not least because of their upbringing and cultural milieu in which they were formed and they live. In conclusion, the democratic values \u200b\u200bof today plunge their roots in the more distant past, that the Gospel message. The message of the cross would be a humanist message, which can be read independently of its religious dimension, consisting of a set of principles and values \u200b\u200bthat form the basis of our democracies.
The cross reference to this message, it would be perfectly compatible with secularism and accessible to non-Christians and nonbelievers, who might accept it since it would evoke the distant origins of these principles and values . In conclusion, the symbol of the cross can be seen as devoid of religious significance, its exposure in a public does not in itself constitute an infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.
36. According to the Government, this conclusion is confirmed by analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court which requires a much more active interference that mere exposure of a symbol for a finding of infringement of rights and freedoms. Thus, it is an active interference that resulted in the violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in the case Folgerø (Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], No. 15472/02, ECHR 2007-VIII).
In this case, it is not the freedom to join or not to a religion that is at stake, because in Italy this freedom is fully guaranteed. It This is not the freedom to practice religion or not practice any, the crucifix is \u200b\u200bin fact explained in the classroom but it is not required of teachers or students to send him any sign of hello, reverence or mere recognition, let alone recite prayers in class. In fact, he did not even ask them to pay any attention to the crucifix.
Finally, the freedom to educate children according to parents' beliefs is not at issue: Education in Italy is totally secular and pluralistic curricula contain no reference to any particular religion and religious instruction is optional.
37. Referring to Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen (December 7, 1976, Series A, No. 23), where the Court found no violation, the Government argues that, whatever its evocative power, a image is not comparable to the impact of an active behavior, daily and extended in time as teaching. In addition, it would be possible to educate their children to private school or at home by tutors.
38. The national authorities have considerable discretion in matters as complex and delicate, closely related the culture and history. Exposure of a religious symbol in public places would not exceed the margin of appreciation left to States.
39. This is especially true in Europe there are a variety of attitudes on the subject. For example, in Greece all civilian and military ceremonies include the presence and active participation of an Orthodox clergyman, moreover, Good Friday, the national mourning was declared and all offices and shops are closed, as in Alsace.
40. According to the Government, the exposure of the cross does not undermine the secular state, a principle enshrined in the Constitution and in the agreements with the Holy See. She would not indicate a preference for a religion, since it would recall a cultural tradition and human values \u200b\u200bshared by people other than Christians. In conclusion, exposure of the cross does not disregard the duty of impartiality and neutrality of the state.
41. Moreover, there is no European consensus on how to effectively interpret the concept of secularism, so that states would have a wider discretion in the matter. Specifically, if there is a European consensus on the principle of secularism de l'Etat, il n'y en aurait pas sur ses implications concrètes et sur sa mise en œuvre. Le Gouvernement demande à la Cour de faire preuve de prudence et retenue et de s'abstenir par conséquent de donner un contenu précis allant jusqu'à interdire la simple exposition de symboles. Sinon, elle donnerait un contenu matériel prédéterminé au principe de laïcité, ce qui irait à l'encontre de la légitime diversité des approches nationales et conduirait à des conséquences imprévisibles.
42. Le Gouvernement ne soutient pas qu'il soit nécessaire, opportun ou souhaitable de maintenir le crucifix dans les salles de classe, mais le choix de l'y maintenir ou non relèverait du policy and thus meet the criteria of opportunity, not legality. In the historical development of law outlined by the complainant, that the Government does not dispute, it should be understood that Italy, though secular, has freely decided to keep the crucifix in classrooms for various reasons, including the need to find a compromise with the Christian-based parties representing an essential part of the population and the religious sentiment of it.
43. Whether a teacher would be free to expose other religious symbols in classrooms, no provision would ban.
44. In conclusion, the Government asked the Court to dismiss the complaint.
c) The third party
45. The Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) disputes the arguments of the respondent Government.
The cross, the crucifix and more, can only be seen as religious symbols. The GHM also challenges the assertion that we must see the cross in something other than religious symbol and that the cross is the bearer of human values, he believes that such position is offensive to the Church. In addition, the Italian Government would not have even indicated a single non-Christian who would agree with this theory. Finally, other religions would see in la croix qu'un symbole religieux.
46. Si l'on suit l'argument du Gouvernement selon lequel l'exposition du crucifix ne demande ni salut, ni attention, il y aurait lieu de se demander alors pourquoi le crucifix est exposé. L'exposition d'un tel symbole pourrait être perçue comme la vénération institutionnelle de celui-ci.
A cet égard, le GHM observe que, selon les principes directeurs de Tolède sur l'enseignement relatif aux religions et convictions dans les écoles publiques (Conseil d'experts sur la liberté de religion et de conviction de l'organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (« OSCE »)), la présence d'un tel symbole dans une école publique may constitute a form of implicit teaching of a religion, for example by giving the impression that this particular religion is favored over others. If the Court in Case Folgerø said that participation in religious activities can affect children, then, by GHM, the exhibition of religious symbols may also have one. We must also think of situations where children or their parents may fear retaliation if they chose to protest.
3. Findings of the Court
d) General principles
47. Regarding the interpretation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in the exercise of the functions that the state assumes in the field of education and teaching, the Court identified in its jurisprudence the principles outlined below are relevant in this case (see in particular Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark
, Judgement of 7 December 1976, Series A, No. 23, pp. 24-28, § § 50-54, and Campbell Cosans v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 25 February 1982, Series At No. 48, pp. 16-18, § § 36-37, Valsamis v. Greece, Judgement of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 VI, pp. 2323-2324, § § 25-28, and Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no 15472/02, ECHR 2007-VIII § 84).
(a) You must read both sentences of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the light not only from each other, but also, in particular, Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention.
(b) is the fundamental right to education that is grafted the right of parents to respect their religious and philosophical convictions and the first sentence does not distinguish any more than the second, between public education and private education. The second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is to safeguard the possibility of pluralism in education, essential to the preservation of "society" as conceived by the Convention. Due the power of the modern state, it is mainly through public education that needs to achieve this goal.
(c) Respect for parents 'convictions should be possible within the framework of an education capable of providing a school environment open and inclusive rather than exclusion, regardless of students' backgrounds, beliefs religious or ethnic origin.
The school should not be the scene of proselytizing or preaching, it should be a meeting place of different religions and philosophical convictions, where students can learn about their thoughts and traditions respectives.
(d) La seconde phrase de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 implique que l'Etat, en s'acquittant des fonctions assumées par lui en matière d'éducation et d'enseignement, veille à ce que les informations ou connaissances figurant dans les programmes soient diffusées de manière objective, critique et pluraliste. Elle lui interdit de poursuivre un but d'endoctrinement qui puisse être considéré comme ne respectant pas les convictions religieuses et philosophiques des parents. Là se place la limite à ne pas dépasser.
(e) Le respect des convictions religieuses des parents et des croyances des enfants implique le droit de croire en une religion ou de ne croire en aucune religion. The freedom to believe and the freedom not to believe (negative freedom) are both protected by Article 9 of the Convention (see, in terms of section 11, Young, James and Webster v.
UK, August 13, 1981, § § 52-57, Series A No. 44).
The duty of neutrality and impartiality of the state is incompatible with any discretion on the part of it as to the legitimacy of religious beliefs or ways of expressing them. In the education context, neutrality should ensure pluralism (Folgerø, § 84).
b) Application of these principles
48. For the Court, these considerations lead to the obligation of the State to refrain from imposing, directly or indirectly, beliefs, places where people are dependent on him or in places where they are particularly vulnerable. The schooling of children is a particularly sensitive because, in this case, the binding power of the state is imposed on spirits that are still missing (depending on level of maturity of the child) the ability to take critical distance report to the message under a preferential choice expressed by the State in religious matters.
49. By applying the principles above to this case, the Court must consider whether the respondent State, in imposing the exposure of crucifixes in classrooms, oversaw the exercise of its functions of education and learning that knowledge is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic and respected the religious and philosophical convictions of parents, in accordance with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.
50. To examine this question, the Court will take into account the particular nature of religious symbol and its impact on students at a young age, especially children of the applicant. Indeed, in countries where the vast majority of the population belong to a particular religion, the manifestation of the rites and symbols of this religion without restriction of place and manner, may constitute a pressure on students who do not practice that religion or those who adhere to another religion (Karaduman v. Turkey, decision of the Commission on May 3, 1993).
51. Government (paragraphs 34-44 above) justifies the requirement (or does) to display the crucifix when referring to positive moral message of the Christian faith, which transcends the secular constitutional values, the role of religion in Italian history as well as rooting it in the tradition of the country. He attributes the crucifix neutral and secular significance with reference to the history and tradition of Italy, closely related to Christianity. The Government argued that the crucifix is \u200b\u200ba religious symbol but it may also represent other values \u200b\u200b(see Administrative Court of Veneto, No. 1110 of March 17, 2005, § 16, paragraph 13 above).
In the opinion of the Court, the symbol of the crucifix has a plurality of meanings including the religious meaning is predominant.
52. The Court considers that the presence of crucifixes in classrooms goes beyond the use of symbols in specific historical contexts. She also felt that le caractère traditionnel, dans le sens social et historique, d'un texte utilisé par les parlementaires pour prêter serment ne privait pas le serment de sa nature religieuse (Buscarini et autres c. Saint-Marin [GC], no 24645/94, CEDH 1999 I).
53. La requérante allègue que le symbole heurte ses convictions et viole le droit de ses enfants de ne pas professer la religion catholique. Ses convictions atteignent un degré de sérieux et de cohérence suffisant pour que la présence obligatoire du crucifix puisse être raisonnablement comprise par elle comme étant en conflit avec celles-ci. L'intéressée voit dans l'exposition du crucifix le signe que l'Etat se range du côté de la religion catholique. This is the meaning adopted officially in the Catholic Church, the crucifix which assigns an underlying message.
Therefore, the apprehension of the applicant is not arbitrary.
54. The convictions of Ms Lautsi also concern the impact of exposure of the crucifix on his children (paragraph 32 above), age at the time of eleven and thirteen. The Court recognizes that, as stated, it is impossible not to notice the crucifix in classrooms. In the context of public education, it is necessarily perceived as an integral part of school and can therefore be considered a "powerful external symbol" (Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), No. 42393/98, ECHR 2001 V).
55. The presence of the crucifix can be easily interpreted by students of all ages as a religious symbol and they will feel educated in a school environment characterized by a particular religion.
What may be encouraging some students to religious, can be emotionally disturbing for pupils from other religions or those who profess no religion. This risk is especially prevalent among students belonging to religious minorities. Negative freedom is not limited to the absence of religious services or instruction religious. It extends to the practices and symbols expressing in particular or in general, a belief, a religion or atheism. This negative right deserves special protection if the State expresses a belief and if the person is placed in a situation she can not escape or just by making efforts and sacrifice of proportion.
56. The exposure of one or more religious symbols can not be justified either by the request of other parents who want religious education according to their beliefs, nor, as the Government argues, by the necessity of a necessary compromise with political parties of Christian inspiration. Le respect des convictions de parents en matière d'éducation doit prendre en compte le respect des convictions des autres parents. L'Etat est tenu à la neutralité confessionnelle dans le cadre de l'éducation publique obligatoire où la présence aux cours est requise sans considération de religion et qui doit chercher à inculquer aux élèves une pensée critique.
La Cour ne voit pas comment l'exposition, dans des salles de classe des écoles publiques, d'un symbole qu'il est raisonnable d'associer au catholicisme (la religion majoritaire en Italie) pourrait servir le pluralisme éducatif qui est essentiel à la préservation d'une « société démocratique » telle que conceived by the Convention, pluralism has been recognized by the Constitutional Court law (see paragraph 24).
57. The Court considers that the compulsory display of a symbol of a particular faith in the exercise of the public in relation to specific situations under government control, particularly in classrooms, restricts the right of parents to educate their children according to their beliefs and the right of schoolchildren to believe or disbelieve. The Court considers that this constitutes a violation of these rights because the restrictions are inconsistent with the duty of the State to respect the neutrality in the exercise of la fonction publique, en particulier dans le domaine de l'éducation.
58. Partant, il y a eu violation de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 conjointement avec l'article 9 de la Convention.
II. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 14 DE LA CONVENTION 59. La requérante soutient que l'ingérence qu'elle a dénoncée sous l'angle de l'article 9 de la Convention et de l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 méconnaît également le principe de non-discrimination, consacré par l'article 14 de la Convention.
60. Le Gouvernement combat cette thèse.
61. La Cour constate que ce grief n'est pas manifestement mal fondé au sens de l'article 35 § 3 de la Convention. Elle relève par ailleurs it does not conflict with any other ground of inadmissibility. It should therefore be declared admissible.
62. However, given the circumstances of this case and the reasoning that led her to find a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 9 of the Convention (see paragraph 58 above), the Court believes that there is no need to consider the case of addition in terms of section 14, either alone or combined with the above provisions.
III. ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 63. Under Article 41 of the Convention, "If the Court finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols, and if the law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to this violation, the Court awarded the injured party, if necessary, afford just satisfaction. "A. Damage 64. The applicant seeks the payment of a sum of at least EUR 10 000 for moral damages.
65. The Government considers that a finding of violation would be sufficient.
alternative, he believes that the amount claimed was excessive and unsupported and seeks dismissal or reduction in equity.
66. Since the Government has not declared his willingness to revise the provisions governing the presence of the crucifix in classrooms, the Court considers that, unlike what happened in the case Folgerø and others (cited above, § 109), the finding of a violation does not suffice in this case. Therefore, acting in equity, it gives 5 000 EUR to non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs
67. The applicant is requesting 5 000 EUR for costs and expenses incurred in the Strasbourg proceedings.
68. The Government notes that the applicant has not substantiated his claim, and suggests the rejection of it.
69. According to the jurisprudence of the Court, an applicant can not obtain reimbursement for costs and expenses in so far as they have actually and necessity and reasonableness of their rates. In this case, the applicant has produced any evidence to support his claim. The Court therefore decided to reject it.
C. Default interest
70. The Court considers it appropriate to base the rate of interest on the interest rate on the marginal lending facility from the European Central Bank plus three percentage points.
BY THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Said there had been a violation of Article 2 du Protocole no 1 examiné conjointement avec l'article 9 de la Convention ;
3. Dit qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner le grief tiré de l'article 14 pris isolément ou combiné avec l'article 9 de la Convention et l'article 2 du Protocole no 1 ;
4. Dit
a) que l'Etat défendeur doit verser à la requérante, dans les trois mois à compter du jour où l'arrêt sera devenu définitif conformément à l'article 44 § 2 de la Convention, 5 000 EUR (cinq mille euros), pour dommage moral, plus tout montant pouvant être dû à titre d'impôt ;
b) qu'à compter de l'expiration dudit délai et jusqu'au versement, ce montant sera à majorer simple interest at a rate equal to the marginal lending facility from the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Rejects the claim for just satisfaction for the remainder.
Done in French, and notified in writing by November 3, 2009, pursuant to Article 77 § § 2 and 3 of the Regulation.
Sally Dollé Tulkens
Clerk President
